I say surprisingly good because I approached this book with some trepidation, there seem to have been an awful lot of books 'explaining' the Georgian Age and this period of history generally. Colley had also picked out a very broad and dynamic period to try to sum up in a relatively limited space. However, I was very pleasantly surprised with this book which I think provides an asset to anybody interested in this period. Colley shows herself to have a very good grasp of her material, but she also manages to bring in a broad range of information - from political movements to ballads, to satires to art - to make some thought-provoking conclusions.

As a social history it is well written but cannot hope to thoroughly cover every issue from the chosen era - a period defined from the Act of Union in 1707 until the start of the Victorian age in 1837. Of course this period of history includes some of the biggest changes in British culture and social structure - the rapid decline of disease, the huge jump in population, the industrial revolution with all its influences on roads, canals, post and so on. Colley instead has limited herself to some major issues and the changes - she divides these subjects up into 8 broad areas, Protestants, Profits, Peripheries, Dominance, Majesty, Womanpower, Manpower and Victories.

Having recently read the Amanda Foreman's biography of Georgiana, 5th Duchess of Devonshire - I was most interested in Colley's discussion under the section on Womanpower, on the role of women in society using the active role of Georgiana Duchess of Devonshire and the role of the caricaturists and satirists of the day and I thought Colley managed to shed new light on the subject and women's role at this time.

However, there were some disappointments - no doubt due to the size of the book versus the topic covered - some things were treated with less thoroughness than they deserved. I felt for instance the problems of the Militia was dealt with in too short a manner. It really was predominantly the post-1803 problems of militia with some minor references to the Militia acts of the previous century. Why is this important? Well the militia did provide a vital role for law and order in a country without a police force, and that the British public were very reluctant to have an armed force at all - however given that a large proportion of the period of this book (1707-1837) was spent at War with France then I think that this subject deserved a bit more thorough treatment.

The book is illustrated in B/W pictures which intersperse the text occassionally. It is very well footnoted and all in all I think an excellent asset for anyone interested in this period.

Linda Colley demonstrates her abilities as a top-shelf social historian in "Britons." Her command of widely diverse source material is remarkable--her presentation of popular ballads, cartoons, and broadsheets is both delightful and interesting. However, in her rush to demonstrate the consensual nature of "Britishness," she glosses over some very difficult issues (like the deliberately omitted question of how the Irish never became "British") and assumes away some others (she exaggerates the importance of the Stuart threat after 1746, and attributes Catholic Emancipation too much to 'popular demand' and too little, as Wellington understood as Prime Minister, to the fact that the Irish would surely fight for it). Although this is an admirable piece of scholarship, it fails to recognize that the peoples of the 'Celtic fringe' were generally dragooned into being British; their early participation in empire-building was more a result of escaping the poverty of Ireland or Scotland than of some newly minted transcendent patriotism. Nevertheless, this book is well worth the read, albeit with a large grain of critical salt.

...this would be a good book. But if you know more this book will be slightly disappointing. Welcome to Linda Colley's new book about the British Empire which looks at it through the unusual prism of captive narratives. Colley's new book is oddly similar to her last book, "Britons", having approximately the same number of pages (c.380), the same number of illustrations (c.75-80), and the same number of notes. Colley's book is part of a particular British history genre. Following in the path of Simon Schama's "Citizens," these books are often lavishly illustrated and rely less on systematic research than amusing and telling anecdotes. Although the authors often have strong opinions, their interest lies less in their originality than at their ability to bring to the public an element of scholarly research that hitherto been overlooked. Similar authors include Orlando Figes, Niall Ferguson, and, in a pinch, Andrew Roberts.

Colley's book can be divided into three parts. First, she discusses the narratives of Britons captured by the Barbary and Algiers Corsairs in the 17th and 18th centuries. Second, she uses the narratives of those captured by Native Americans to highlight the relationship between the Britons and their American colonies. Thirdly, she looks at those Britons captive in India, either at the hand of rival kingdoms, or as soldiers captive in their own army. Throughout this book, Colley has a sharp turn of phrase ("The thin red [Imperial army] line was more accurately anorexic.) And she has an eye for fascinating detail. We learn that in the 1820s, two out of every five soldiers in Bermuda were whipped, and we are told about a particularly horrifying one in which the victim was whipped to death such that his back was "as black as a new hat." We learn that Irish soldiers in the 1680s in Algiers spoke in Gaelic to each other so that the English Protestants helping the besieging Moroccans wouldn't understand. We learn that not only did the British have campaigns for the benefit of the French prisoners they caught during the Seven years War, but the French held similar campaigns for the British prisoners they caught. We also get a sense of the continual expansion of the Empire. In the relatively quiet decade of the 1840s alone, Great Britain gobbled up New Zealand, Natal, the Punjab, and Hong Kong among other places.

Colley has two messages from her captivity narratives. First, there is the constant ambiguity of response. The British often could not help admitting the civilization of the Ottomans, the courage of the native Americans, and the resourcefulness of their Indian rivals. Many Britons admitted even more, and many crossed over to the other side, although the attempt to do so had their own difficulties and ambiguities. Colley constantly, indeed somewhat repetitively, argues that there was no monolithic racism. Secondly, she points out the constant vulnerabilities of the empire. Imperial overstretch was always a problem. Consider the example of the Barbary captives. Why would the British spend decades paying ransom for thousands of captives? The answer is that the Mediterranean was vital for British ambitions, and since the Spanish were not likely to subsidize their hold on Gibraltir, Muslim trade was vital for British provisions, and for the British hold on it. Similarly, British control of India required a tactful attitude towards its Native sepoys.

Much of this is interesting, and the chapter on British soldiers in India is very informative. But I have a number of reservations. (1) The constant use of illustrations shows a weakness in comparison with "Britons." There, Colley's discussion of national iconography was acute and informative. Here the illustrations are much less so. (2) Colley's arguments about racism, like those of her husband David Cannadine in "Ornamentalism," are based on a straw man. "There are those who argue, with the utmost sincerity, that were the British to remind themselves of their empire it would only further incite the racism inextinguishably associated with it." (376) Who are those people precisely? Post-colonial scholars, such as Barbara Fields, or Theodore Allen or David Roediger and others are well aware that racism has a history, and is not an invariable constant. David Brion Davis pointed out in the sixties that 18th century writers agreed that Africans did not live in a state of simple savagery. Yet Colley quotes none of these writers. (3) Colley's chapter on the American revolution is based on limited research. Allen Kulikoff is much more interesting on the viciousness of the war, and Colley does not even mention Bernard Bailyn, Edward Countryman, J.C.D. Clark, Gordon Wood and other scholars. (4) Finally, the constant emphasis on ambiguity and nuance tends to blur the fact that many indigenous populations were defeated, devastated, and in the case of Newfoundland and Tasmania, exterminated. Many of the subjects of the Ottoman and Mughal empires would fall under British rule. Some discussion of whether this was a good thing or a bad thing would be in order. And Empire and imperialist ideology did not only affect the Empire's subjects and citizens. Conquering the world would inspire other countries: Hitler was an admirer of the British empire.

I love books that get you to reexamine your attitudes or to at least look at something familiar in a new way- and not just for the sake of "novelty", but because the author has something important to say. "Captives" is such a book. What more can be said about the British Empire? The answer turns out to be quite a bit. Ms. Colley takes a look at four areas: North Africa, North America, India and Afghanistan- and examines the "captivity experiences" of white Britishers...soldiers, East India Company representatives and their families, merchant seamen, etc. This alone would be fascinating, because it is a subject rarely dealt with. But in addition to the "human interest/storytelling" aspects of the book, Ms. Colley has some serious, scholarly points to make. One is that, for the period covered in this book, it was certainly never clear, not even to the British, that there was going to be a British Empire. Britain was geographically small, had a small population and therefore a small army, and technology wasn't yet so far advanced that the British could feel confident that their weapons were automatically going to win battles or intimidate people. Another point the author makes is that due to consistent manpower shortages, the British could never just rely on their own forces. They had to depend on local, native troops. This was most obviously true in India, but it was also true in North America. The British had no choice other than to use Native American warriors against the French during the Seven Year's War and Native Americans and Blacks against the "rebels" during the Revolutionary War. Since the British needed these "outside" forces it influenced the way these "outsiders" were perceived and treated. For example, while Americans of European ancestry would caricaturize Native Americans as "savages", the British, in paintings of the period, would tend to show Native Americans in a way which, they felt, made them look "civilized" i.e.-in European dress or they would give them somewhat European features or mannerisms. Politically speaking, the British had to be careful not to antagonize or alienate these "mercenary" forces. They needed them too much. So, for example,if Native American forces killed prisoners who had surrendered or scalped civilians, the British sometimes just had to look the other way. In India, the absolute necessity to rely on native Indian troops influenced the way the British saw these troops. Ms. Colley cites quotations showing the sepoys were seen to be abstemious, intelligent and reliable, while the common soldier from Britain was seen to be a drunken, thieving brute who had to be kept in line with the lash. This punishment was much more likely to be used on the soldier from Britain, by the way. If the sepoys mutineed or deserted, that would result in the loss of about 85% of the British forces. As far as North Africa went, since they needed to hold onto Gibraltar and Minorca, the British had to "cut a deal" with the Barbary states and pay protection money. Once again, they weren't powerful enough to do otherwise. In Afghanistan, in the 1840's, the British would have to make alliances with certain warlords in order to try to defeat other warlords. The Royal Navy couldn't help out in a landlocked country! And, in a parallel with the present, Ms. Colley shows that it's a lot easier to invade Afghanistan than it is to accomplish what you want to accomplish and to get out. As you can see by what I've been writing, Ms. Colley doesn't just deal with the actual, physical nature of captivity. (She does deal with that, in detail, also. There are numerous "captivity stories" based on published and unpublished diaries and manuscripts.) Much of the "restraint" is political (what policies are necessary and what actions are acceptable) or intellectual/emotional (needing "outsiders" affects the way you think or feel about them). Ms. Colley is far too intelligent and too good a scholar to ever present any simplistic conclusions about any of this material. For even though many people could look on Native Americans, Blacks and sepoys, etc. in a favorable light, there were many people in Britain (both civilians and in the military) who could look down on those they considered to be their "inferiors". Hence, while during treaty negotiations at the end of the American Revolution British representatives would make sure to bend over backwards to protect the rights of loyalists, Blacks and Native Americans would be ignored. And condescending, racist attitudes would certainly contribute to the Indian Mutiny of 1857. While some physical captives would "go native"- adopt native dress and learn native language, convert to Islam, take a native spouse, etc., others would never look on their captors, even after long periods of time and even if treated well, as anything other than "barbarians". As Ms. Colley points out, history is rarely just about the past. The lessons and nuances of the "captivity experiences" of 200-300 years ago are still being learnt and felt today. There are still plenty of examples of racism (a worldwide phenomenon...obviously not confined to Britain) but Ms. Colley also notes that Britain has the highest instance of interracial marriage in the world. So, perhaps we can all hope that familiarity sometimes breeds something much more positive than contempt.