this book tells about the relations with china and the U.S. about their crazy relationship but don't buy this book it is not as good as you think okay so what are you waiting for go out and but it. just make sure you don't buy it!

This is a good book to read if you are looking for positive facts about Asian and American relations. Cohen goes through much of the history of America's foray into East Asia, and he discusses the history of the changing relationship between East Asia (especially China) and the various American administrations. I especially liked how Cohen confined his study to East Asians, rather than the current academic trend of lumping all of Asia (Russia, Pakistan, India...) together. It makes much more sense this way.

On the other hand, Cohen is very selective in the facts that he reveals. He mentions how America brought democracy to S. Korea and Taiwan, and how America helped create the sports culture and the student movements. While he presents some good data on America's involvement in Asia, he also skips or skims over some very important issues.

For example, he says that American culture was never forced on Asian people, and that the American media was accepted by the Chinese people willingly and without coercion. What he neglects to mention is the fact that cross-cultural relationships don't have to be militarily enforced in order to be considered "enforced." When one country that is predominantly of one race conquers another country of another race, there are psychological issues of superiority/inferiority that come into play. Considering that most ethnic and gender studies professors today spend copious amounts of time studying this psychological issue alone, it is surprising that Cohen failed to explore it. An example of this psychological damage can be found in the Time Asia article last year (2001!) in which an Asian person questioned whether people of the Asian race even had the ability to compete creatively with white people. The author's contention was that many felt the white race was superior, and that many felt it might be pointless to even try to compete. Another example: in both Asian and Asian American literature, often one will find that all white male characters are good, and almost all Asian men are weak and bad. Obviously this is not reality: not all Asian men are bad (though there are some), nor are all white men good (though good white men also exist). To write a book about Asia without referring to this terrible inferiority complex is to tell only half the picture.

Cohen also ignores some important facts when making statements of opinion. For example, he mentions that Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam was inspired by Wilson's Fourteen Points, and then goes on to say Ho's interest accomplished little. What Cohen doesn't mention is that Ho was so inspired by Wilson that he wanted American help in ending French domination of Vietnam, and that he was ready to start talking about a democratic Vietnam. When Ho tried to approach Wilson in France with a plan to have America help establish a new system of government in Vietnam, Wilson's men wouldn't allow Ho to even talk to the president, saying that self-determination was only for white men (read the book "Ho" by David Halberstam). Ho then went to the person who was willing to help him--Stalin. By not mentioning this crucial fact, Cohen makes it seem as if Ho rejected democracy, when in fact history shows that democracy (or racism, depending how you look at it) rejected Ho.

All in all, this is a good intro book to Asian and American relations, but there are some crucial elements missing. My advice would be to read this book but to supplement it with other readings.

-- A Readable Well-Thought Perspective --
I enjoyed reading Cohen's perspective on Asian-American realtionships; it includes many interesting insights on the historial, current and potential future directions between the the U.S. and Asia. Cohen's extensive dicsussion of U.S.-Japan U.S.-China and U.S.-Korea history helps put todays' world events into perspective. Americans DO tend to view the world through a Eurocentric lens; this books shows a different path. Cohen's (sociological) insights into cultural impacts and exchanges are top notch. This book is a well written, deceivingly light read that packs in many complex ideas into a very readable package.
...and the restaurant tips aren't bad either. ;) Cheers, Patrick

Written in 1980, this was the first full length assessment of Dean Rusk. Since then, there have been only three other books published on Rusk. This is surprising for a man who was the second longest serving Secretary of State and a key actor in the Vietnam War. At the time, Cohen's book filled a gap in the literature and it remains an important work for anyone seeking to understand Rusk, his approach to foreign policy, and his role in the Vietnam War.

Cohen begins his book with a short chapter on Rusk's early life. The next fourteen chapters cover Rusk's rise from Under-Secretary of State in the Truman administration to Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The main part of the book, chapter six through chapter fifteen, focuses on the Kennedy and Johnson era with particular attention on the Vietnam War. Other important foreign policy events, such as the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1967 Mideast War, are covered, but the Vietnam war is central. While still an important book, it now shows its age. Broadly speaking, this can be seen in two areas: its historical context and its historical scholarship. I will address each of these concerns in turn.

By historical context, I mean that the war is still fresh in Cohen's mind. Although his scholarship is excellent, there are moments where his interpretation of the Vietnam War contends with the objectivity of his scholarship. Fortunately, these moments are rare. As Cohen said in his preface, he rarely touched on matters of interpretation and neither he nor Rusk sought to coner the other to his way of thinking regarding the Vietnam War. Even with thse infrequent issues of interpretation, the book's scholarship is still solid.

In the central part of the book, Cohen examines Rusk's approach to the Vietnam war. His work in this area is quite good. This is noteworthy considering he did not have access to recently released documents on the Vietnam War or the latest scholarship on American policy. Cohen uses the term liberal exceptionalism to describe Rusk's view of American foreign policy. Roughly understood, Rusk believed America should uphold a decent world order based upon liberal principles found within the UN Charter and the American regime. Although he is in broad agreement with these principles, Cohen argues that they led to the mistaken commitment to South Vietnam. America became immoderate in pursuit of these ideals. On p. 128 Cohen shows that Rusk extended the promise of the Truman Doctrine to include South Vietnam. A regional doctrine was now global. Cohen argues that Rusk's belief in America's liberal exceptionalism blinded him to the imprudence of defending South Vietnam. In the end, this liberal exceptionalism and the post World War Two foreign policy consensus, ruptured over the Vietnam War. Americans confronted with the horrors of an undeclared war in South Vietnam began to question the exceptionalism that jusitified the war. Rusk committed to liberal exceptionalism, could not see the error of his ways. Cohen ends with the following judgement.

"Rusk, however, remained loyal to his President and to an earlier vision. He thus betrayed his own better instincts, the interests of his country, the principles of the UN. Much may be said in mitigation, but never enough" (p. 330)

With the end of the Cold War following the Soviet Union's disintergration, Rusk and America have been vindicated to some extent for their stand in Vietnam. (See for example Michael Lind, The Necessary War, 1999). While the war and its effect on American society will be debated for years to come, Rusk's stand in the 1960s appears justified to some extent by developments since the war ended.

The second area where the book shows its age is in its historical scholarship. New material on Rusk has ben released and new scholarship has emerged on the Vietnam War. Three books on Rusk hae been published since Cohen's book. Rusk's early life is discussed more fully in Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War, 1988 and Dean Rusk's own book As I Saw It, 1990. Moreover, these books offer a better understanding of Rusk's time as Under Secretary of State in the Truman administration. Thomas Zeiler draws on this material to develop a fuller understanding of Rusk's approach to the Vietnam War. See Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad, 1999.

Scholarship on the Vietnam War has also developed since Cohen's book was published. Recent works, drawing on the latest Foreign Relations of the United States volumes concerning the vietnam War, offer a more detaild understanding of events in the era. An exampole of how the literature has changed since Cohen's book was published can be seen in chapter seven. There he relies upon Roger Hilsman's To Move a Nation, for the events and policy concerning the Diem coup. Hilsman's work, which now appears more self-serving, rather than an objective assessment, has been eclipsed by more recent scholarship. See for example David Kaiser's An American Tragedy, 2000. Althought such examples can be distracting for those interested in specific policy decisions, the overall scholarship and assessment of Rusk's approach to foreign policy remain relevant.

One point where Cohen is wrong must be noted. In the preface, he states that there are no Rusk papers. the papers that do exist are held in the Richard Russell Library at the University of Georgia. While these are not official appaers in the sense of private memos and correspondence during his time in office, they do shed light on Rusk's early life as well as the period after he left Washington.

Warren Cohen's book is over twenty years old, but it remains a good starting point for understanding Rusk.

The scope of this book is amazing, but the best part is how the author demonstrates the interactions of so many groups in East Asia from the earliest of times to the present day. Instead of focussing only on China and Japan, it also focuses on Korea, Vietnam, Tibet, and all others who were vital to the development of what is Asia today. It is surprising how China, throughout much of its history was so dependent on its tributary states. It is noteworthy to know that the Koreans provided much of Sino-Koreanized culture to Japan, thus it is obvious that the author used sources other than Japanese documents which are already biased to fit their own ethnocentric view. If one is looking for depth, this book is not for you. What this book does is touch on the significant parts of each culture, perhaps for you to look further on your own.

Mr. Cohen is an able historian. The 400 pages of history flow by effortlessly. One of the most interesting byproducts of such scale is that historic ebb and flow are easily seen. I especially liked how Mr. Cohen broke out different areas, like Japan, to focus on in context of the time being discussed.

Take for example the cycles of military might and success, followed by decadence and the loss of territory to other conquerors or to various groups reasserting their independence. Often we're told that nothing lasts forever, it's fascinating to be able to watch it happen over and over.

It's also instructive to see the economic cycles. The coastal cities that would flourish with trade, only to be taxed into poverty. Since there was no wealth to support the authorities efforts to tax, piracy would flourish. With the piracy came greater wealth, which again attracted the tax man in an ever-repeating sequence.

The awful scale of the murders of millions of people by Tojo, Mao and Pol Pot only seem to be glossed over until one realizes that this same kind of thing has been going on for thousands of years. Individuals in the Eastern cultures have never had the moral importance of those in the West.

Unfortunately, Mr. Cohen is not an economist. While his historical reporting and context are excellent, when it comes to modern times the book fails. Mr. Cohen preaches interventionist monetary policy and fiat currency without being aware that the modern economic failures he decries are the result of just such actions by the governments of Asia in the latter half of the 20th century.

I would recommend this book to anyone who wants a general background of China and its environment, especially to anyone who was educated in China and wants to know the history that the Party has suppressed in their textbooks.