Penn has led me to insight into my own mixed-up family as my mother seems to have forgotten her own mixblood memory--had it not been for my grandparents, I would have never known my great-grandparents were members of the Delaware nation. Racial shame is the wrong way to bring up your children, and Penn clearly depicts the suffering it inflicts upon the entire family.

I think that good autobiography brings us to that space and place in our humanity where we must stop and rethink America's history so we do not continue to make the same mistakes again. Penn relates how American history has affected his own family from Chief Joseph to the present. What I enjoyed most was the way he wove textual criticism of other Native authors and their works into the story of his life. He is truly a gifted storyteller, and knows how to connect with his reader.

This is an amazing book. It is hard to write about one's own family and make it interesting. To go further and make it not only interesting, but relevant to others, takes a writer of rare talent. Penn is clearly such a writer, and I was very pleasantly surprised at the creative and original approach taken in this work. The author draws thought-provoking parallels and connections between his own mixblood Indian family's dreams, visions, failures and successes, and those of other families, in particular other native and mixed-blood families, including exploration of the writing of many historical native American figures. This is a creative and very original book, highly recommended.

"The Old Army" is a successful attempt to explore the men, the officers, the families, the training and the way of life of the peacetime Army from America's inception to the Spanish-American War. Volumes have been written about the Army during various wars and how volunteer forces contributed to the victories. Here, Edward Coffman discusses the the so-called caretaker Army that manned the lonely frontier outposts, and how it progressed to the organized machine it is today. Although it's a natural progression, it's not easy to see it without the strength of Coffman's narrative and his ability to balance deeply personal views of soldiers in the field with the major policies issued by the powers-that-be. Much reviled, maligned, and distrusted by the American public, the peacetime Army is truely the grandfather of today's modern military. Although many people credit the temporary wartime armies with that distinction, Coffman traces the struggles that the civilian and military leaders had to endure in order to produce an effective military. This excellent work contains revealing excerpts from personal journals that provide a clear view into this forgotten way of life ranging from reasons why people joined, deserted, and came back again. Coffman devotes a great deal of time to minorities, in the military, and wives and children of the soldiers to give us a well-rounded view of what garrison life was like. Coffman also discusses the real, but overlooked work of the early army: the building of forts, buildings, and public roads. Long considered a haven for misfits and incompetents, the Old Army deserves a deeper scruitiny. Coffman provides the kind of indepth study that has long been lacking. Coffman's ability to focus on the larger history of the Army while still providing illuminating anecdotes makes this fascinating reading.

This book is probably very good for a student studying war, but it's by no means an interesting coffee table type of conversational piece. It's more like a textbook , not not for me, and not for you either, I suspect.

If you are looking for a coffee table book about war, stop here. There is no need for you to continue. This one is as good as they come. However, this is not a book on West Point. (for that, I recommend "West Point", by Norman Thomas Remick). The title is somewhat confusing in that respect. But, don't let that stop you from looking at this great job done by the Dept. of Military Art and Engineering.

Look I'm not actually reviewing this book - but I do have some comments about the reviews:

If the date is 1900-1918 in the title, how does this cover Bismarck's Germany, which would be before 1900? Similarly how serious is the league of nations coverage (which I would guess would be 1918-1939 approximately)

One of the reviews mentions WWII - but again, how does this fit in the 1900-1918 range?

An excellent picture of the Army between the World Wars. It offers an especially detailed view of the Army school system of the time. HIghly recommended for anyone interested in US Cavalry, or the military in the inter-war period.

On the back of this book, Stephen Ambrose praises this work as a definitive work on the US involvement in World War I, I should have been suspicious of its content from that point on.
Coffman's book beyond the first couple chapters is immensely not readable, and at times absolutely confusing. The early part of the book rushes through how the US ultimately came to be involved in the war, and only mentions the Lusitania, the resumption of German unrestricted submarine warfare, the Zimmerman telegram and social factors inside the US among groups that thought war wouldn't be such a bad idea in order to gain premacy for their viewpoint, fleetingly. It also doesn't really discuss Wilson's rejected attempts at mediation of the conflict and his realization that in order to reshape Europe in the way he advocated, the US needed to be involved in the conflict and have "troops on the ground." Coffman also doesn't discuss how demonizing portrayals of Germany and German soldiers influenced American perception as well as the fact that due to the blockade of Germany and the cutting of the trans-atlantic cable by the British, Germany could not dispell any of these demonizing tales spread in the US of the German army killing civilians and bombarding religious and other historical places with reckless disreguard.
What Coffman does give us in this work is a monotonous tome about the organization of the AEF and American air corps. The majority of this book is focused on nothing more than logistics and how the Allied powers needed American force very badly and therefore wanted to hasten our entrance into the war and allow troops to be commanded by French or English commanders, and not seperately. He also drones on about the internal conflict between Pershing and the British and French generals over this and other aspects.
To compound this boring tome on logistics, Coffman jumps around in his story. He finally gets to combat done by American pilots, and then in his next chapter begins with an extensive biographical sketch of American armed forces leaders, completely confusing the reader. By the time Coffman gets to actual combat participated in to any large extent by American forces, he stuffs all of this information into one chapter, completely losing the reader.
Coffman's maps included in the text are also few and far between as well as horribly designed. The maps don't clearly show the advance of US forces on each day of the battle being discussed, and do not include where the German trenches are relative to the Americans.
In short, this may have been a good book thirty years ago, but now it's hopelessly outdated and confusing. There needs to be another scholar in the mode of Martin Gilbert write the story of the AEF and American air corps.

Coffman provides an interesting perspective on the First World War. His reader will find no discussion on the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand or information of the Schlieffen Plan. He will instead find details on the Selective Service Act and the famous American air ace Eddie Rickenbacker. Throughout this work, Coffman shows the United States as an important player in the Great War, and refreshingly he does not rehash the European aspects of the war about which so many others have written. Furthermore he is effective in his task, and his reader will have a better understanding of the American World War I military experience. Primarily Coffman examines the US Army, but he also devotes time to the Navy, Air Force, and the Marines. The book gives glimpses at the performance of each branch, and gives brief amounts of information about technological innovations during the war - especially in the realms of naval and air power. As one would expect, Coffman also writes about the major American military leaders such as John J. Pershing and William J. Donovan, but more interesting than his accounts of these men are his vignettes of common soldiers. Coffman obviously devoted a great deal of time conducting interviews with and reading the journals and letters of veterans. These portraits allow the reader to gain a real sense of the military experience of the Americans who fought in the war. Coffman's monograph is an excellent account of the United States during World War I. It is well written and researched, and it even includes enough maps that descriptions of battles can be understood. Its only drawback, and a minor one at that, is that the reader must already have a general understanding of the events in the Great War. Of course Coffman did not set out to write a general history of the war, but a general reader would need more background in order to truly gain the sense of America's wartime experience about which he writes.

In recent decades, social historians have strayed from the study of key historical figures and prominent events and instead focused their efforts on the common folk. Incorporating the methodologies of sociology and other disciplines within the social sciences, historians have made tremendous strides in promoting a better understanding of the masses. A few military historians have followed suit. Instead of writing solely about battles, campaigns, and the generals who plotted the strategies and won or lost, they turned their attention on who made up the rank and file. Edward M. Coffman dominates this breed of new military historian. His book _The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I_ is a scholarly and brilliantly written tour de force; his collective group study: the American citizen soldier.First published in 1968 at the height of America's involvement in Vietnam, Coffman set the president for this new style of military history. His work is now a classic. As the subtitle suggests, Coffman tells the story of the whole American experience beginning in the spring of 1917 up to the signing of the Armistice. Throughout the book, Coffman remains focused on the American soldier and the planning, administration, and organization of his primary fighting force; the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).As a result, the political machinations of coalition warfare and high level strategic decisions receives only enough attention to place his subject in proper perspective.The creation of the AEF, the largest American armed force ever sent to fight on foreign soil up to that time, is a marvel in and of itself. Coffman covers all aspects of this tremendous achievement. General John J. Pershing sailed for France with what amounted to a understrengthed division: the 1st Division. The AEF grew to a corps sized force, and evntually the First and Second Armies. In April 1917, the AEF consisted of 200,000 soldiers. By November 1918, it contained nearly 4,000,000. In addition to discussions on the War Department in 1917, and the stateside expansion of the United States Army, the author also covers with clever succunctness other important topics. These subjects include: the meteoric sculpting of the massive AEF command and supply structure in France; the disagreements between the General Staff in Washington and Pershing's Headquarters in Chaumont, France. Coffman also includes separate chapters on the American Navy and the air war. Coffman ties these themes together with a flowing battle narrative of the major campaigns the AEF fought in France as well as, some of the lessor known battles. It is the topics relating to the social history of the American soldier, however, that Coffman excels. The author covers such topics as the draft, procurment of officers, the controversial amalgamation of Negro troops into French units early in the war (Pershing venomously fought attempts by the British and French to amalgamate American soldiers as canon fodder into Allied units. He said Americans will fight as Americans led by American officers. Not so, unfortunately, for Negro troops), and consciences objectors. From a social standpoint, Coffman also examines: the establishment of recreation facilities for the soldiers to discourage vice, liquor and prostitutes; venereal disease, and the culture clashes between the French and the newly arrived Americans. Coffman outlines the pros and cons of the American participation but, unlike some critics, is sympathetic to Pershing and the AEF. He is most sensitive to the role the fledgling American debut played in turning the tide and eventual victory for the Allies. Coffman makes every attempt to reveal the gratitude the French had for the American presence. Among the plethora of sources consulted, the author refers to numerous diaries and memoirs from the ordinary rank and file. An extensive "Essay on Sources" in which Coffman not only lists the archival material utilized, but also divulges how the information was applied to individual chapters, is a consolation for the lack of footnotes.The creation and deployment of the AEF in World War I is a watershed in American military history. If you want to learn not only how it was done, but also who made up its main body, this is the book to read. No one does the social history of the American army like Coffman.

The Lost Battalion was originally written in 1938 and has been re-issued with minor editing in 2000. For those readers seeking a companion volume to the 2000 A&E film by the same title, this book is more than a bit disappointing. However, the lost battalion is an interesting journalistic account of the seven companies of the American 77th Infantry Division who found themselves cut off behind German lines for six days during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in the First World War. About 550 US soldiers under the command of Major Charles Whittlesey were trapped in a small river valley under constant German fire. As the authors point out, the unit was neither a single battalion nor was it ever "lost," merely isolated. By the time that Whittlesey's command was finally relieved, the unit had suffered 65% casualties. Whittlesey himself was awarded the Medal of Honor for his stubborn defense. Yet the main lesson of this tale of combat heroism is that, "the human capacity for endurance, for mere passive defense, exceeds all belief and possibility as long as there be a leader to say, don't give up, we're not licked yet."

The book is divided into chapters that cover each day from 2-8 October 1918, with events arranged chronologically. Edward M. Coffin, a modern-day historian at the University of Wisconsin who arranged for the work to be re-printed, provides a short effortless forward. There are several photographs and a few totally inadequate maps that supplement the text, but only weakly. Unfortunately, Mr. Coffman made little effort to update or augment the original narrative and while the story flows smoothly, a lazy and jingoistic style might annoy after awhile. The authors are comfortable with using non-words like "ploying," or "funk-hole" [i.e. foxhole] and attacks that "corkscrew (the soldiers twirl around while advancing?).

Readers expect a hero may be perplexed by Major Whittlesey. Initially, the Harvard-educated lawyer seems comparable to Joshua Chamberlain, the soldier-scholar who won the Medal of Honor at Little Round Top in 1863. Certainly this book paints Whittlesey as a man devoted to duty, who was the only battalion commander to reach his objective and then refused to be budged off by repeated German counterattacks. While Whittlesey demonstrated determination and obstinacy, his actual command abilities are less certain because there were few decisions for him to make after his initial un-opposed occupation of the objective. Thereafter, Whittlesey's role became rather passive - encouraging resistance and vigilance - but not making any critical decisions. Furthermore, Whittlesey's post-war suicide three years later compared poorly with Chamberlain who went on to live a long, productive post-war life. The author's allude to Whittlesey's post-war guilt, particularly sentiments he expressed that his unit's sacrifices served no useful purpose. If this was so, then why did Whittlesey not retreat before the German ring closed around his unit? Having been ordered not to give up ground without direct orders from the division commander, Whittlesey was content to await rescue, but he demonstrated little initiative or imagination. Certainly Whittlesey 's actions merited a Medal of Honor, but the accusations that the price of two virtually destroyed battalions was hardly worth the moral victory that was achieved bears consideration. Apparently Whittlesey himself doubted the value of this sacrifice. Given the inability of Whittlesey to live with the decisions he made and the losses his unit suffered, it is also possible that Whittlesey was fundamentally un-suited to making the kind of life-or-death decisions required of a combat leader. While some of these questions are addressed in the book, the reader should recognize that important questions about combat ethics and psychology have been given short-shrift in the interest of story-telling.

Certainly one of the most interesting aspects of the book is the perspective provided from the German side. The authors were able to obtain interviews with many of the Germans who fought against the Lost Battalion and their side of the story indicates that desperation was not unique to Whittlesey's intrepid band of doughboys. In fact, the German front was beginning to crumble and they never had sufficient reserves to crush Whittlesey. Indeed, while German attacks were constant, the worst damage to the Lost Battalion was done by friendly artillery fire and hunger. One odd omission in this account is that the author's fail to mention that Corporal Alvin C. York of the 82nd Division won his Medal of Honor in the attempt to relieve the Lost Battalion.

Modern readers should also recognize the subtle anti-military bias, common to America in the 1930s, which pervades these pages. The authors want to honor these men as heroes, but not as soldiers. In trying to put the Lost Battalion incident in perspective, the author's conclude, "that the men of the 77th Division lacked not for courage, intelligence, patriotism or any other fundamental quality, but simply that they were poorly trained and insufficiently experienced. Seen from this angle the ultimate responsibility rests on the Washington authorities who sent such soldiers to a major war, and the lesson is that democracies should not engage in mass wars, for when they seek a universal competence they tend to lose democracy." This pro-isolationist hogwash asserts that despite the heroism of soldiers such as Whittlesey, military effort and preparedness fundamentally threatens and debases democracy. In fact, the lesson of Whittlesey and Alvin C York should be that democracies can produce soldiers every bit as good as totalitarian states, but without the need for militarized cultures. Unfortunately, America's enemies also failed to note our ability to produce heroes such as Whittlesey and York and instead perceived the United States as soft and unwilling to sacrifice. Three years after the Lost Battalion was published, the Axis powers demonstrated what happens to democracies that eschew military preparedness.

If you are at all interested in WWI or the US Army and it's traditions, read this book. It was written in the 30's based on documentation and interviews with the living participants. One of the writers was a correspondent. They spin a very lively tale about the "Lost Batallion", a group of men that advance "without regards to their flanks" during an offensive in WWI and get cut-off.

The story is grand. It's filled with heroism, cowardice, triumph and tragedy.

Now, on to the history. While the story is a great read and very good supporting documentation comes with the book. Sometimes the story telling gets in the way of the history. Also, the author's didn't explain the physical location of the events well enough to visualize and the pictures provided are, while interesting, unhelpful. These are the only things preventing this from being a 5.

It's interesting that the sort "cauldron" battle that takes place is similar to the one that the Germans one on the Eastern Front, Tannenburg. It also brings into mind all the cauldron battles that were to take place during WWII. It's a shame these authors didn't write this book after that war, just to see if they compared and contrasted the different events.