The mind/body problem, as understood by philosphers for the last few centuries, has been buried under a mountain of neuroscience. One can of course still tunnel into this mountain if desired and dig further in the mine of armchair argumentation and speculation. But more and more philosophers are abandoning this mine, and employing their unique talents and restless desire to get at the truth, to a view of the mind/brain that is more in tune with empirical research. It is perhaps difficult for the traditional philosopher to make this transition, for they feel perhaps that they are abandoning their commitment to the goals they have set. To these philosophers science is a derived field of knowledge, and has an underlying foundation given by philosophy. To turn against this view would be a sacrilege to many philosophers.

The author of this book is one of the best examples of what can happen when a philosopher has made the decision to investigate what neuroscience has to offer for the understanding of the mind/brain. It is packed full of highly interesting insights from someone who has been deeply engaged in research in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. The advances in neuroscience in just the last few years have been breathtaking, particularly in experimental methods. Some of these developments are discussed in the book, along with good arguments that cast further doubts on the ability of philosophical speculation to produce a workable theory of the mind (brain).

The need for such a theory of mind (brain) is argued especially well for in the first few chapters of the book. The author emphasizes that merely refuting various materialist views of the mind (brain) will not by itself lead to an understanding of it. The dualists and idealists must put forth a constructive theory of the mind that will assist not only in forming a theory of knowledge and thinking, but also with shedding light on the cause of Alzheimer's and other mental disorders. The author gives as an example of this the ideas of the neuroscientist John Eccles who held that the mind-brain interaction is mediated by a "psychon", but the properties and dynamics of psychons were never elaborated on.

The author bases the book on three hypotheses, namely that mental activity is brain activity and can be studied scientificially; that neuroscience is dependent on cognitive science in order to know what phenomena need to be explained; and that to understand the mind one must understand the brain at all levels of organization. The examples and argumentation/counterargumentation given througout the book bring out these hypotheses especially clearly, and the author expresses a rare intellectual honesty in all of the discussion. This is perhaps because she has chosen to assign weight to both the scientific and philosophical viewpoints, and such a careful consideration will only raise the level of objectivity, and suppress the vitriole or subjective biases that sometimes accompanies discussion of the mind/body problem.

One of the most interesting discussions in the book concerns the scientific study of consciousness, in particular the discussion on "Crick's assumption": there must be brain differences when a stimulus is presented and the subject is aware of it, and a stimulus is presented and the subject is not aware of it. The author discusses a fascinating experiment, dealing with "binocular rivalry", that allows an experimental study of Crick's assumption. This discussion, among many others in the book, are excellent examples of what is now available experimentally to help settle the mind/brain debate. In another example, the author points to the use of artificial neural networks with recurrent projection to model consciousness-related functions such as attention and sensory perception. She also discusses a clever experiment to test this idea, but cautions that even if back projections are necessary for consciousness, it is known that they are not sufficient. The author then draws up a list of possible experiments that might identify the neural correlates of consciousness, which, even if shown to be not viable, will assist in the fulfilling of the goal of viewing consciousness in terms of mechanisms. In addition, and to emphasize the necessity for a hierarchical "systems level" study of consciousness, rather than merely at the "neuronal level", she discusses the very interesting work of Antonio Damasio on viewing the capacity of consciousness as the outcome of high-level self-representational capacities. His work, as discussed by the author, emphasizes the role of evolutionary pressures in shaping the nature of human consciousness. Further, the author addresses (nine) of the arguments against a scientific theory of consciousness in terms of brain function put forth by those who advocate dualism. She is not shy about saying that the dualist theories are beginning to appear as an "outdated curiosity", but she analyzes these nine objections fairly and objectively, and she is clearly open to possible future arguments put together by dualists.

The author also discusses some "hardcore" issues in philosophy, such as free will, epistemology, and religion. She addresses some possible reasons why nonempirical epistemology continues to be around, one of these being the rise of modern logic in the twentieth century. The other is the slow progress in the understanding of the human brain. Both of these reasons are interesting because of their importance for research in artificial intelligence. Both formal reasoning and an understanding of how the brain does pattern matching, generalizations, and induction is crucial to the efforts in machine intelligence. Fortunately, the author and others like her, with their formulation of ideas like the ones in this book, will be of enormous assistance to those involved in bringing about the rise of intelligent machines.

Well, it took more than a decade, but finally those interested in philosophy and neuroscience get an up to date version of Churchlands's NEUROPHILOSOPHY, the groud-breaking and field- creating textbook. Churchland, witht he clarity that characterizes her writings, and the no-nosense naturalistic viewpoint she takes, explains what neuroscience has to say about philosophical problems like consiousness, freewill, the self, theory of knowledge, religion (the fact that some of these problems in fact are now considered neuroscience problems, not philosophical ones, show that neurophilosophy as a field has been succesful, as has been Churchlands approach). But philosophy is still of value, only that its value only exists when it takes science seriously. Just as ancient philosophical problems like the origin of life, the nature of matter, space and time, have become the subjects of independent scientific fields of biology and physics, the mind, and its faculties, is being reduced to the field of neuroscience. There is no reason why this fact should be seen as unexpected or strange or weird. It is as obvious as it can be, and it has brought unprecedented understanding and predictive power, facts that render dualism and its branches an unecessary burden, and a potential setback towards understanding the mind.

The chapters are well written, clear and referenced superbly, with notes and suggested readings. The choice of topics is timely, and Churchland does a good job (although understandably she presents mostly theories in accord with her views and what she thinks is really important) of presenting the main theories and keeping them clear even when omitting certain technical details. The philosophical parts are also well argued for, and her position is defended well. I have allways thought the Churchlands to be the most seriously naturalistic and common sensical of all cognitive scientists. Although the chapters will not explain the self, learning, representationalism, or even less, consicousness, they will point the reader towards what seem to be the right paths to be taken towards genuine understanding.

This book is simple and reader-friendly, the kind necessary to ilustrate the layman that there is little of philosophy worth arguing for left untouched by scientific advancements. Science is just philosophy that is understood,effective, that explains, and that makes genuine progress. We have a much more complete theory of the mind after 50 years of neuroscience research than we got in thousands of years of philosophical discourse. Neurophilosophy is the branch that aims to ground philosophy of mind in neuroscience research, and this books is the best introduction to it out there. Churchland has done it again, and although much work remains to be done, given that the mind is seen by some as the last standing mystery, the progress made for a moment brings back confidence in our ability to understand these issues...finally.

In sum, philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, psychologists....anyone that uses the word mind, consicousness, self, thinking....should have this book, and pretty much every intelligent reader should too.

A book for a limited audience. You have got to be interested in some really seminal, currently unresolved issues of how the great invention of the ALU (arithmetic logic unit) still employed in every computer built to the present day, was a compromise effort by this genius. His thought was to model the human brain, and the ALU succeeded in modeling just a small part, but he was totally frustrated and unsatisfied by the result--for good reason. He points out that the very language of the human brain has not yet been discovered--the orders of magnitude by which its process and results exceed the merely digital high speed comparator we call a computer (my apologies to Bill Gates!) clearly demonstrate the existence of a logic and a mathematics, the simplest rules of which as yet defy all our efforts to understand its workings, while we experience its results every time we think. Depth of logical levels, and depth of arithmetic levels necessary to achieve the requisite results we obtain from our Crays and our PCs are scorned by the human brain in a radical simplicity as yet undiscovered (not in that it does it, but in how it does it: therefore he postulates the existence of a radically, essentially different math and logic inherent in its workings). He lays out the discoveries of Turing, McCullough and Weiner in a brilliant tour de force of known (1955)neurological and cybernetic discoveries, and how they charted his course in creating the ALU. He compares analog and digital and mixed models of computing but (in my opinion) oversimplifies the digital aspect of thinking and memory, deeming them to be the route used by the human brain in performing its unruffled magic. He closes by posing two questions that express the wonderment faced by a high level intelligence when accosted by the facts he was unable to wrap mental arms around: 1)"what essential inferences about the arithmetical and logical structure of the computing machine that the nervous system represents can be drawn from these ...conflicting observations? and 2)what are the logics and mathematics in the central nervous system [that must be]structurally *essentially* different from those languages to which our common experience refers? His fellow researcher, Warren McCullough similarly closed out his life and research by repeating a question that plagued him all his life: What is a number, that a man can know it, and a man that he can know a number?

This is a great book that pushed the limits of his time; his swan song, to be delivered as the Yale Silliman lecture, but never was, due to Von Neumann's tragic untimely death in his early fifties.

Perhaps the most famous and often quoted line in this remarkable book appears on page 39, where von Neumann declares that "The most immediate observation regarding the nervous system is that its functioning is prima facie digital."

The "prima facie" modifier is commonly taken to mean von Neumann saw the brain as "obviously digital," or "patently digital," and that it therefore must resemble a digital computer. But as you read the rest of the book, you quickly discover that this is not what John von Neumann intended. Von Neumann uses words cautiously and precisely, and to him, "Prima facie" means exactly what it says: "on its face."

In 1956, the brain appeared digital. But von Neumann thought this impression might be superficial. He thought that deeper biological investigation might well demonstrate that the nervous system is not, in fact, digital, or not completely digital. He believed it might work in some more sophisticated way, and suggests that perhaps some intermediate signaling mechanism, a hybrid between analog and digital, might be at work in the brain. For this and other reasons he actively resisted labeling the brain as a digital computer.

In the mid 90s, evidence began to appear that von Neumann was probably right to reserve his judgment. These curious new results show that a single nerve impulse is somehow able to convey information to the brain. This signal seems distinctly un-digital. A number of theories have popped up, some attempting to explain this whopping new mystery, others attempting to explain it away. But its impact on neurophysiology, and on conventional computer models of the brain, is pretty shocking. Not to say, devastating. (See Spikes, by Rieke et al, for a readable account of this story.) When the smoke clears, it would not be surprising if people go all the way back to John von Neumann, looking for traction, fresh starting points, and for von Neumann's wonderfully broad sense of what is possible in neurobiology - a sense we have evidently lost to progress in the years since he wrote this splendid essay.

Von Neumann did not include in this book his interesting views on the nervous system of the eye. He was an early adopter of visual memory systems in digital computers, and he was evidently intrigued by the way the retinal cells of the eye are arranged to look backward, that is, toward the screen of the back wall of the eye. Possibly he thought the retinal cells saw back there a thin film diffraction pattern. You can find his interest in the nervous system of the eye remarked in his brother Nicholas Vonneumann's book, John von Neumann as seen by his Brother, and this reminiscence is also paraphrased in Poundstone's Prisoner's Dilemma. Finally, some of the worldly story of von Neumann, his digital computers, and their role in the creation of the hydrogen bomb can be found in MaCrae's biography.

Perhaps the most famous and often quoted line in this remarkable book appears at the beginning of Part II, where von Neumann declares that "The most immediate observation regarding the nervous system is that its functioning is prima facie digital."

The "prima facie" modifier is commonly taken to mean von Neumann saw the brain as "obviously digital," or "patently digital," and that it therefore must resemble a digital computer. But as you read the rest of the book, you quickly discover that this is not what John von Neumann intended. Von Neumann uses words cautiously and precisely, and to him, "Prima facie" means exactly what it says: "on its face."

In 1956, the brain appeared digital. But von Neumann thought this impression might be superficial. He thought that deeper biological investigation might well demonstrate that the nervous system is not, in fact, digital, or not completely digital. He believed it might work in some more sophisticated way, and suggests that perhaps some intermediate signaling mechanism, a hybrid between analog and digital, might be at work in the brain. For this and other reasons he actively resisted labeling the brain as a digital computer.

In the mid 90s, evidence began to appear that von Neumann was probably right to reserve his judgment. These curious new results show that a single nerve impulse is somehow able to convey information to the brain. This is distinctly un-digital. A number of theories have popped up, some attempting to explain this whopping new mystery, others attempting to explain it away. But its impact on neurophysiology, and on conventional computer models of the brain, is pretty shocking. Not to say, devastating. (See Spikes, by Rieke et al, for a readable account of this story.) When the smoke clears, it would not be surprising if people go all the way back to John von Neumann, looking for traction, fresh starting points, and for von Neumann's wonderfully broad sense of what is possible in neurobiology - a sense of possibilities we have evidently lost in the years since he wrote this splendid essay. He is eloquent on the problem of selecting a memory "organ," and evidently thought the worst choice would be a neuron.

Von Neumann did not include in this book his interesting views on the nervous system of the eye. He was an early adopter of visual memory systems in digital computers, and he was evidently intrigued by the way the retinal cells of the eye are arranged to look backward, that is, toward the screen of the back wall of the eye. Possibly he thought the retinal cells saw back there a thin film diffraction pattern. You can find his interest in the nervous system of the eye remarked in his brother Nicholas Vonneumann's book, John von Neumann as seen by his Brother, and this reminiscence is also paraphrased in Poundstone's Prisoner's Dilemma. Finally, some of the worldly story of von Neumann, his digital computers, and their role in the creation of the hydrogen bomb can be found in MaCrae's biography.

I found this book to be a bit of a disappointment. I suppose if you want an over-view of scientific thought on the brain, then this might be interesting. The Dalai Lama mostly asked questions and the scientists spoke about science. Only once did a scientist ask the Dalai Lama a point about Buddhism, and then it was only to set him up to be debunked. The scientists just can't accept any view point that is not materialist. They don't even understand other viewpoints except as superstition. So there is no real dialogue.

Actually, I didn't really expect a dialogue when I bought this. I was hoping for some clarity and insight into Buddhist thoughts on consciousness, using Western terminology. No such luck.

Gave it a few stars because everyone was intelligent and articulate.

This book explains in a very clear and accesible way what are the differents viewpoints between Neuroscience and the Bhuddist religion. It discusses how the mind is conformed, how it learns, and the way it reorganizes itself.

This book is a very important door for the future of the humanity.

This book begins with a complete and somewhat dry but useful tour of the history of neuropsychology, complete with major discoveries and the arguments that predated them, showing their conclusions and how it has led to the construction of an in-progress model of human intelligence. This is followed by a summarization of general epistemological arguments from the discipline of philosophy, concluding with a general understanding of how our world functions relative to our own intelligences. In the process, the author argues convincingly for a materialist - or "limited to the physical world only" - understanding of human consciousness and how thoughts are generated, avoiding un-politically-correct conclusions entirely but thoroughly debunking any religious, dualistic or overly idealized conclusions about human individuality. Rough reading at times but an excellent compendium of information.

Published over 17 years ago, this book was one of the first examples of the now accelerating trend to make philosophical investigations into the mind/brain problem accountable to modern science. Pure speculation once dominated any discussion of the mind (or the brain) and therefore progress in the field by any measure was non-existent. There are of course still purely philosophical investigations into the mind/body problem, but these will no doubt decay rapidly with time as scientific investigations continue to lay to rest various "impossibility" claims philosophers have made about the physical brain. Indeed, in this century, the rise of machine intelligence will hammer the last nail in the coffin of mind/brain philosophical speculation.

The author of the book is a materialist, and in this book she has given an excellent justification of her position, and expresses at all times fairness to those who disagree with her positions and conclusions. She also expresses a rare intellectual honesty about the scientific evidence supporting her claims, informing the reader at every place in the book where it is not available or weak at best. Without a doubt the author was not happy at the state of philosophy at the time the book was published, holding that it completely omitted neuroscience, and embraced in her words "a novel and sophisticated form of dualism". She explains this was ample reason for her to take the plunge into a more scientific/empirical framework. The book is an excellent example of what can result when a philosopher decides to do this.

The book is divided up into three parts, with the first one emphasizing the biology of nervous systems and neuropsychology, the second part an overview of developments in the philosophy of science, and the third part discussing the ramifications of neurobiology for research in artificial intelligence. Although somewhat out of date due to the advancements in both experimental and theoretical neuroscience since then, it could still be of interest, mainly to philosophers, who are interested in applying their talent for logical thinking and organization to difficult problems in neuroscience. The transition from pure philosophical speculation to the rigors of scientific investigation may at first be difficult for the typical armchair philosopher, but their high degree of intelligence and their restless desire to get at the truth will soften it considerably. And in the decades ahead, one will witness the presence of "industrial philosophers": those who have chosen to leave the "proverbial armchair" and apply their abilities to both understand and give rise to intelligent machines.

This book is now a bit dated, so its importance is much more historical. This book was intended to show philosophers some neurobiology and neurobiologists some philosophy. It follows from Churchlands strict scientific view of philosophy, and her at that time eliminitavist position - the belief that all folk-psychological concepts can and should be replaced by scientific concepts of neurobiology. So the book introduces neuroanatomy, function, etc... but that maeterial is somewhat dated. There is an introduction to philosophy of science. But the core argument is that philosophy of mind should use neurobiological insights in theorizing, and the belief that it will be at the end neurobiology all thet there is to it.

For some reasons, this is no place to critique the books views. This was the first serious and very ambitious attempt into integrating neurosicience and philosophy of mind to tackle problems like cosnciousness, perception, action, etc.. Elimitivism is not highly regarded nowdays, and the fuzz about connectionist models is fading away. Some proposals were naive, even. But the book is still a classic in the field of cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and well, neurophilosophy.

If you are an eliminative materialist then you need help! Not that there aren't some interesting observations in this book - see the chapter with new data on "filling in" - but Churchland's tired example of Maxwell's discovery of electromagnetic waves only demonstrates how subjective the entire world of science really is. A more interesting example might be Maxwell's equations and how they relate to entropy, but I suspect that Churchland's actual knowledge of physics is more on the level of Betty Crocker's knowledge of microwaves...

As for neural nets: go read Perlovsky! I find it odd that Churchland, who loudly proclaims nets as the future of AI, doesn't appear to have read any of Perlovsky's papers; but I suspect he's too busy waving magnets in his living room generating EM waves.

A good collection of essays by recognized leaders in a burgeoning field of philosophy. Some are only useful if what the article is discussing is quite familiar to the reader. This holds in particular for some of the articles on qualia and the article on R. Penrose. It could also be said that the article on Dennett could have been marginally better if the last part, concerning his motivations, were snipped.