The authors provide a coherent discussion of fully half of the security challenges facing us in the 21st century. They wisely avoid the debate swirling around the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)-but deserve credit for their predecessor "offset strategy"-and simply note that the absence of "A List" threats gives us an opportunity to strengthen and maintain our traditional nuclear and conventional capabilities against the day when a Russia or China may rise in hostility against us. The book as a whole focuses on the "B List" threats, including Russia in chaos, a hostile China acting aggressively within its region, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and catastrophic terrorism. They note, correctly, that most of the spending and effort today is focused on responding to the crisis de jure, some but not enough resources are applied to preparing for the future, and virtually nothing is being done against the latest concept, that of "shaping" the environment through "forward engagement." Perhaps most importantly, they introduce the term "defense by other means" and comment on the obstacles, both within the Administration and on the Hill, to getting support and funding for non-military activities with profound security benefits.

Although others may focus on their discussion of Russia and NATO as the core of the book, what I found most helpful and worthwhile was the straight-forward and thoughtful discussion of the need for a new national strategy, a new paradigm, for dealing with potentially catastrophic terrorism. Their understanding of what defense resources can be applied, and of the impediments to success that exist today between state & local law enforcement, federal capabilities such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and defense as well as overseas diplomatic and intelligence capabilities, inspire them to propose several innovative approaches to this challenge. The legal and budgetary implications of their proposals are daunting but essential-their proposals for dealing with this one challenge would be helpful in restructuring the entire U.S. government to better integrate political-diplomatic-military-law enforcement operations with judicial and congressional oversight as well as truly all-source intelligence support.

Interesting side notes include 1) the early discovery in US-Russian military discussions that technology interoperability and future collaboration required the surmounting of many obstacles associated with decades of isolated (and often secret) development; 2) the absence of intelligence from the entire book-by this account, US defense leaders spend virtually all of their time in direct operational discussions with their most important counterparts, and there is very little day to day attention to strategic analysis, estimative intelligence, or coordination with diplomatic, economic, and law enforcement counterparts at home; 3) the difficulty of finding a carrier to send to Taiwan at a time when we had 12 carriers-only four appear to have been "real" for defense purposes; and 4) the notable absence of Australia from the discussion of security in Asia.

The concept of Preventive Defense is holistic (requiring the simultaneous uses of other aspects of national power including diplomacy and economic assistance) but places the Department of Defense in a central role as the provider of realigned resources, military-to-military contacts, and logistics support to actual implementation. Unfortunately the concept of Preventive Defense has been narrowly focused (its greatest success has been the dismantling of former Soviet nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States), and neither the joint staff nor the services are willing to give up funds for weapons and manpower in order to make a strategy of Preventive Defense possible.

This resistance bodes ill for the other half of the 21st Century security challenge, what the author's call the "C List"-the Rwandas, Somalias, Haitis and Indonesias. They themselves are unwilling to acknowledge C List threats as being vital to U.S. security in the long-term (as AIDS is now recognized). I would, however, agree with them on one important point: the current budget for defense should be repurposed toward readiness, preparing for the future, and their concept of preventive defense, and it should not be frittered away on "C List" contingencies-new funds must be found to create and sustain America's Preventive Diplomacy and its Operations Other Than War (OOTW) capabilities. It will fall to someone else to integrate their concept of Preventive Defense with the emerging concepts of Preventive Diplomacy, International Tribunals, and a 21st Century Marshall Plan for the festering zones of conflict in Africa, Arabia, Asia, and the Americas--zone where ethnic fault lines, criminal gangs, border disputes, and shortages of water, food, energy, and medicine all come together to create a breeding ground for modern plagues that will surely come across our water's edge in the future. On balance, through, this book makes the top grade for serious bi-partisan dialogue, and they deserve a lot of credit for defining solutions for the first half of our security challenges in the 21st Century.

This is a quick read about how American Defense has to change from the Cold War strategy to deal with other types of threats. I just returned from Europe and heard from European friends about their feelings on the United States. We are highly respected and looked up to as "the" power. We need to deal with the rest of the world accordingly. The authors give us some ideas as to how to do this.

This is not a book for the average reader. Unless you are involved or very interested in the national defense structure this is not a book that will appeal to you. Keeping the Edge is an anthology of defense analysts deliberately attempting to influence the opinion of the then-incoming administration of President Bush at the beginning of 2001. The authors and editors are very up front about this, seeing the beginning of the Bush presidency as the optimum time to effect their recommended changes in policy, structure and management of the defense structure.
This is a book about the "Big Picture." When logistics are discussed here it is not the variations, trials and tribulations of projecting logistic support to Marines from Over The Horizon support ships, it is the very methods of procurement at the national level, used by the Department of Defense. When intelligence is the topic they are not discussing templated enemy positions and the "most dangerous" course of action of an enemy regiment, they are talking about reform of intelligence collection procedures and organizations at the CIA/NSA/DIA level. For most readers, for that matter for most anyone outside of the Washington, D.C. beltway this may be interesting, but difficult to follow.
If, however, national defense issues and structural reform at the national level is your cup of tea then this book is for you. Inhabitants of the various military-focused think-tanks in the Washington, D.C. area will certainly want a copy. The majority of the recommendations, even when they are not earth-shattering, do appear well reasoned and rational. If the Marine Corps and the Rapid Deployment Forces of the Army are the "tip of the spear" then this is a book about what makes that spear lethal. After all, a spear without a long pole attached is merely a knife. It takes the weight of that spear shaft to impart the energy to allow the spear tip to penetrate and kill. The authors are trying to make that shaft better, something not often addressed.

Here's a cold dose of reality that will shock moribound, parochial, tortoise-like bureaucrats in the military, intelligence community and within the ranks of civil service. Carter has assembled a host of brilliant, experienced and innovative thinkers, backed by their successful personal resumes, and has created a useful guide for necessary change within government. The author and other contributors resoundly articulate what the innovative, aggressive, forward looking and frustrated military and civilian memebers of the defense, executive and intelligence communities have been advocating since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Hopefully, several of the contributors will be confirmed for administration positions, and despite gravity, complacency and down-right bureaucratic fear, actually begin the inertia of needed change within the defense, intelligence and civil service bureacracies.

I purchased this book because I have an interest in Nuclear Weapons Systems. This book, however, kind of misses the mark.

On the plus side. the book is actually a work of several authors; each treating a seperate (and diverse) topic. The culminated work, in very small type face, is a few pounds heavy.

On the minus side, very little actually touches on specific weapons systems. Albeit,there is a great section on arming, fuzing, and firing systems, worth the price of the whole book, the majority of the book touches on policy, communications, and command/control issues, most of which was rendered moot by Ronald Regan and the end of the cold war.

If you are interested in Policy Issues of the 80's, you will LOVE this book. If you wanna see the guts of a W-80, I heartily recommend anything by Chuck Hansen or Richard Rhodes. Money better spent.......

One of the first things you notice is the weight of this tome, (1 5/8-inch spine) and the intellectual weight of contributors to the book. Household names include John Toomay, Russell Dougherty, Michael May, Paul Bracken and the editors. Flipping through the work reveals an essential list of acronyms, outstanding graphics, and thoroughly-footnoted text. The book is divided into three sections: (1) nuclear operations, (2) the command system, and; (3) policy perspectives. My primary interest was in policy, (which required reading the whole book). Highly technical subjects like communications links are rendered at a level that I had no trouble understanding. Technical descriptions are so well written that even elected officials will understand them. Common misconceptions among memebers of the public are discussed. One such misconception is that a nuclear exchange is supposed to flatten everthing in the opposing nation. An interesting, related film describing Minuteman training operations is "Missile," Zipporah Films, 1986.