It discuss goes over the many of the myths of WW2. Discusses the battles quite clearly.

The only concerns I have over the book is that I doubt that the English goverment would have accept terms during the battle even if Churchill had not been in charge.

Unlike Americans, who have an uncommon love of bragging about everything from the trivial to the terrific, the English have a fondness for understatement that tends of ignore the reality of their accomplishments.

When the Soviets asked Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt, the Wehrmacht's most senior operational commander, which battle he considered as the most decisive of the war in Europe. They expected him to cite Stalingrad, instead he said, "The Battle of Britain."

Had the Germans won the Battle of Britain, England could not have won the Battle of the North Atlantic and may well have been forced to accept peace terms similar to France. According to former War Minister Hore-Belisha, "the Tory party in the House were not very interested in the war, were afraid for their possessions and of the rise of Labour . . . . . " The Russians may well have defeated Germany, but that would have left all of Europe under Soviet control, not merely the eastern half of Europe as eventually happened.

The English myth of the Battle of Britain is similar to stories about Sir Francis Drake and the Spanish Armada in 1588, when Drake preferred to finish a game of bowls before sailing out to rout the Spanish. In 1940, the myth created by Churchill is that "Never before has so much been owed by so many to so few." Like Dunkirk, the image was one of luck, pluck and mucking through the confusion, ineptness and amateurism. Bungay shows the triumph of British planning and readiness.

The German image, reinforced by quick and easy defeats of Poland and France, was that of an impregnable military machine guided by highly experienced professionals using superior technology with the rigorous discipline of well trained and effective troops. In contrast, the British were thought to be slightly dowdy country squires lucky enough to deny victory to the superb German military. Much of this legacy is based on the image of the Munich Agreement of 1938, which has ever since been used to describe English politicians as too weak to fight and too scared to rearm.

Reality is quite different. Bungay explains the British victory was based on a superb plan of operations and aircraft development that began in earnest in 1936 and was rigorously carried out in 1940. The basic idea was developed in 1922. Instead of being unprepared and underarmed, Britain was perhaps the world's best prepared and best armed nation in terms of air defense in the 1940s. The result was a decisive British victory which left the Luftwaffe crippled.

To summarize, the British fought the Battle of Britain with a Teutonic thoroughness for organization, planning, discipline and effort; they left little to chance, planned for the worst cases and didn't rely on luck. In short, the British behaved like Germans at their best, though these qualities were tempered and restrained by the civility of traditional English life. The Germans fought with a British thoroughness for bickering, personal petty disputes and trusting in an ability to muddle through; it is hardly an accident that two of the top German commanders committed suicide as a result of the internal wrangling and bitterness within the Luftwaffe high command.

In 1940, the British knew they needed a united effort if they were to win; the Germans didn't adopt a similar attitude until mid-1945, when they realized they would need a united effort if their country was to survive in the post-war period. The British, in 1945, having won through a magnificent team effort, changed governments and embarked on an "I'm all right, Jack" philosophy backed up by union strikes designed to win the maximum benefit for their members even at the price of national economic survival.

Maybe the British should learn to boast . . . . .

However, the irony today is that the epitome of English luxury, the Rolls Royce automobile -- once a product of the same company that in 1940 built engines for Spitfires -- is now powered by engines made by the same company that built engines for the Me-109s that failed so ingloriously in 1940.

But, is that something to boast about?

This is a remarkable book. It is rare to read something that totally changes ones perceptions in the way that this book does. Bungay convincingly dispels the two enduring myths about the Battle of Britain - firstly, the image of the ruthlessly efficient Nazi War machine pitted against the valiant but amateurish "old school tie" RAF, and secondly the perceived wisdom that the Battle was a "close run thing".

However, even whilst dispelling the myths, Bungay succeeds in doing so without detracting in any way from the courage and heroism shown by the young men and women on both sides. On the contrary, by stripping away the fantasy and leaving us with the grim realities of the Battle, the quiet heroism of the combatants is all the more remarkable.

This is a thoroughly professional piece of historical analysis, but it is also an engaging and very readable book.