McGeorge Bundy depicts an unneccesary race to develop nuclear weapons while emphasizing the mindset of the mid-40s. Many interesting sidelights are exposed such as the first nation to deliberately choose not to pursue nuclear weapons (Canada). Bundy's history is especially important in the light of current thinking that Truman merely wanted to scare the h--l out of the Soviets. The history also stresses that the main concern (ending the Pacific war) overshadowed any thoughts of how to manage the gadget after the war. Although many ideas did come up such as sharing the technology with the world, no set policy was developed. As a result, Bundy (and others) believed much of the cold war arms race accelerated.

McGeorge Bundy is that rare bird: a very well-connected person who is also very, very bright -- and a gifted writer too. An absolutely first-rate book

There is no doubt that this is a good biography of the Bundy brothers' life and times. However, a biography is more than the mere reporting of the subject's life. A good biography makes some moral decisions and conclusions regarding the subject's life decisions, as this book has done. Unfortunately, Mr. Bird's overall conclusion seems to be that the decisions made by the Bundy brothers during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, that is to support US imperialism in the third world in Vietnam, Cuba, etc. is undrestandable due to the fact that they wanted to appear to be "tough on the communists".

In the Vietnam arena, for example, Bird makes the same old doves/hawks argument that was perpetuated by the establishment left and right in the US throughout the sixties. The right constantly hollering "we don't want to lose another China" and the establishment left saying "yes that is true but the price (in American lives and Dollars cost) is not worth the effort. Nowhere did it occur to the Bundy brothers, consummate liberal establishment types that they were, that ther was a bigger question to ask, namely, what the hell made Vietnam "ours" to win or lose. Don't the Vietnamese (and, for that matter, the Chinese, the Guatemalans, the Iranians, the Cubans, ... ad nauseum) have the sovereign right to handle their own affairs, especially through popular means without our murderous "assistance"?

Questions like this would not occur to aristocratic liberals such as the Bundy brothers. Unfortunately, these questions also didn't seem to occur to Mr. Bird. As a contributing writer for The Nation, that paragon of the establishment left, this revelation comes as no surprise.

THE COLOR OF TRUTH: MCGEORGE BUNDY AND WILLIAM BUNDY, BROTHERS IN ARMS: A BIOGRAPHY is essential reading for anyone trying to understand American foreign policy in the twentieth century. This book is well-researched and full of previously-undisclosed information. It also provides two portraits of what "establishment liberalism" was, how it developed, and its consequences. In the process, some of the most fascinating moments in American history are illuminated, most of the time unfavorably.

From their respective military careers in WWII to their numerous positions in academia, government, and the non-profit sector, these two brothers were at the center of a huge web of personal and professional contacts in the American establishment. They were in many ways, the best, but also very flawed. This biography reveals those flaws, and the consequences of their failures.

This book is very dense, especially during the sections dealing with the question of Vietnam, and an acquaintance with the brothers' own corpus of work is helpful and increases the potency of the book's analytical edge. It should be required reading for anyone interested in government policy, because it reveals how decisions are made, and how human beings think.

Like nothing else available, Kai Bird's THE COLOR OF TRUTH demystifies liberal pragmatic centrist (the Bundy brothers were EXTREMELY difficult to categorize/pin, politically) contributions to a disastrous post-WWII U.S. foreign policy drift that continues to this day. It does re-cover best/brightest territory, but in the nicest sense of recovery, with graceful focus on key players plus perspective & freedom-of-information access impossible for Halberstam. A case of perfect historian timing? Primary sources still alive/available but no longer needing/wishing to defend/protect/fib too heavily? Bird is a contributing editor for The Nation & dedicates the book, partly, to his parents, lifelong worried opponents of brutal wars in the Middle East, but has no axe to grind, is familiar with context by virtue of previous work on John J. McCloy, appropriately begins with Henry Stimson & Harvey Bundy, father of a couple of perhaps frighteningly blessed sons.

William & McGeorge Bundy grew into decent bright academics who would indirectly destroy millions of humans, plus their own reputations, by doing exactly what bright decent academics get paid do, usually fairly harmlessly. In order to operate in the professional expert marketplace, one must learn to develop/defend theses. Neither of the brothers was a certified official Dr. Henry VIP (an easter egg the size of the Ritz is noted at the bottom of p. 407 of the hardcover) dignitary, but certain allowances can/will be made for the off-the-charts smartly impatient. These guys were good, even superb, at thesis concoction/defense. Also connected well past needing paper proof? Regardless, thesis defense can get out of hand, seriously, if/when thesis basis information turns out to be inaccurate/skewed or even flatly atrociously wrong. What can a responsible expert do? Admit erroneous basis? Revise thesis? Even, if one has accepted a government job, reverse policy? Perhaps. But this can feel mighty embarrassing, or swampy/waffling/kinetic, especially if U.S. troops have already died under prevailing false thesis conditions & elections impend? So, if one is an unusually gifted aristomandarin character, as both William &, probably even moreso, Mac were, all sorts of spinning options are open? After all, one is a professional? Execute the assignment? Indeed.

It took many to generate bloody quagmire in Vietnam. The Bundy brothers were merely essential state-of-the-art instruments (filtering network managers, the postmodern equivalent of loyal trusted Machiavellian courtiers?) humbly serving two Democratic presidents who failed to get a sane/sage grip on something set in motion by congenial Ike. McGeorge Bundy departed in 1966, just as the unreconstructed Texan in LBJ began to explode. Bill left in 1969, before the incoming Nixon plus Dick's own academic favorite, vastly less decent than either Bundy, cranked Vietnam up/down into criminally pointless/cynical brutality, or peace with honor. Bill Bundy eventually wondered, in writing, about the final five years of the futile war he had contributed to failing to curtail.

Bird's chapter on the JFK government adventurism regarding Cuba, which set a tone, is especially valuable, as is his fairly relentless harping on the bizarrely spooky nature/bias of the American electorate during the middle years of the cool quasi-war with the Evil Empire. The Bundy brothers were NOT very bad men, as gentle reader learns as Bird tells of McGeorge at the Ford Foundation or William writing up himself (plus later even more pragmatic others) for arrogant carelessness. But they WERE very bad wizards, which can/does happen when professional experts overestimate their [genius] rights/capabilities, still. Even now? Might be safer to inform/trust our own judgements, sometimes?