How could LBJ forget the blunders of a limited war established by the mistakes of Harry Truman in Korea in less than 12 years? The author outlines all of the questions that cannot be easily answered. How do you end a war once it started? How do you justify the costs in blood and money? And How do you define victory? The writer seems to say, Limited War is like Marriage, easy to get into and hard to exit. The book will enlighten every reader and all American politician responsible for foreign policy should read it. A Superb book for students, professors and men and women in power so it won't happen again.

Peter Braestup's book on the reporting of the Tet Offensive is a critically important book to read for those trying to understand the effect of reporters' all-too-human bias on what information the average citizen has available to him or her, as well as for those looking to find out not only what went wrong in Vietnam, but what the United States and its allies (including South Vietnam) did right - an aspect still all too overlooked.
Though it is critical of some particular newspeople, as well as some politicians and military spokemen of the Vietnam era, the book is highly constructive in tone. Many of the lessons pointed out by Braestrup two decades ago have clearly been taken by the media, judging by the general improvement in war reporting during the current (as of fall, 2001) events in Afghanistan.
It is also a must read for those who question the abilities of democratic states to defend what they believe in.Braestrup lays bare the notions of the time that the allied forces - from ARVN to the U.S. Marines, were not effective, or that they were a corrupt force for undesirable ends.
An added bonus is that Braestrup is a gifted writer; his prose is readable and engaging, and his research is thorough and well documented. This book deserves to be brought out in a new edition (though I did buy mine through the Amazon's used book marketplace, and received excellent service there).

Fialka served as a reporter during the first Gulf War in 1991. This small volume documents the trials and tribulations of FIalka and other members of the press corps dealing with the military, which in most respects was wary of the press, based on experiences lingering from Vietnam.
However, Fialka has more criticisms...his own peers in the press share an equal blame in his eyes, based on the way they handled themselves within the press pool, frequently trying to one up the other. He also criticizes the press organizations who sent reporters with no experience dealing with military matters to cover, what up to this point, was the largest military story since the Vietnam War.
Fialka does have some positive things to say: his praise for the Marine Corp's ability to handle the press stands in stark contrast to that of the US Army. He also praises the tenacity of the reporters that bucked the pool system to get the real story, even risking their own lives to do so.
THis book is an interesting read, based on the complete reverse situation recently demonstrated in the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom. It would be interesting to see what Fialka would say about his brethren who were embedded, and how that may or may not have contributed to getting the best face on a story.
A quick read, and if you can cut through some of the "its not fair" dialogue, a good review of press operations during the first Gulf War.