Otto Pflanze's book describes how Bismarck manipulated domestic and international politics to unify Germany.
This book, ending in 1871 at the end of the first phase of Bismarck's career is the first of three volumes. The book begins by showing how idealists and romantics tried and failed to unite Germany, but Bismarck was a realist and based his methods on the strengths and weaknesses of individuals.

First Bismarck used cunning diplomacy to isolate the Austria, Prussia's rival for control of the German states. The Franco Austrian war demonstrated Austria's weakness, and increased worries among northern Germans about French strength. This improved Prussia's hand, and later Bismarck's hand.

Pflanze follows Bismarck's tactics step by step through his labyrinthine maneuvers as he
played France against Austria during the Schleswig Holstein situation Bismarck wanted to separate Austria from the German confederation and inspire the northern German states to unite into a Northern German confederation.

After Bismarck unified northern Germany he designed the constitution to allow him to play the Reichstag against the Prussian chamber of deputies. There was also a balance of power between the state and confederate governments. We also see domestic political and economic background to Bismarck's actions. Pflanze shows the domestic politics after Bismarck created the northern German confederation.

Bismarck used relations with France to make advances toward the southern German states. Pflanze carefully shows how Bismarck cleverly tried to use the Luxemburg crisis to woo the southern German states. But the southern German states were afraid of being overwhelmed by Prussia. The only thing that the southern German states admired about the northern German confederation was the Prussian military expertise.

Relations between France and Prussia worsened when the throne of Spain was offered to a Hohenzollern Kaiser William did not care if any of his relatives got the Spanish throne or not. But when Bismarck made it seem that the French had demanded that Kaiser William renounce any attention in the Spanish throne, he angrily refused. The nationalist French responded by declaring war.

Bismarck wanted a war with France to inspire the southern Germans to join the northern confederation against the threat of France. In this he succeeded. But nationalist anger of many, and political reasons of Bismarck caused Germany to annex Alsace Lorraine, which resulted in permanent hatred from France.
The only faults of this book are that Pflanze should have described the people more. He also should have included more maps and a bibliography.

This is a work which, if you like solid history, you should read. It tells of the momentous things going on in Europe in the 19th century which are illuminated by this excellent work

George O. Kent's book Bismarck And His Times details the path taken by Prussia that gradually led that nation to unification with other German states under Prime Minister and later Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. That path, however, did not lead the unified Germany towards political maturity, and led to its defeat in two world wars, notoriety for perpetuating the most shocking atrocities publicized in the world, and its division into two countries until eventual reunification in 1990. As a result, Bismarck's achievements were reanalyzed, with post-World War II assessments revealing considerable rust on the "Iron Chancellor"'s facade. Kent is one of those historians, arguing that Bismarck and his foreign and domestic policies were to blame for this tragedy, and the German nation, as well as the North German Confederation that preceded it, "was conceived too narrowly and maintained too rigidly for too long".

Consider the constitution of the North German Confederation created by Bismarck in 1866, a lopsided hybrid of an absolute monarchy and a constitutional state, with the executive and upper house holding most of the power. There was the Prussian king--later the Kaiser of Germany--and the members of the Upper House composed of representatives from the North German states. On the other side was the Reichstag, whose members were elected by male property owners, whose powers were limited to pass or defeat bills introduced by the king or Bismarck; the Reichstag could not introduce bills. In addition, the chancellor could not be brought down by a vote of no-confidence from the lower house, resulting in the dissolution of the government. Bismarck created this constitution mainly to benefit himself and to ensure the power of the king and God.

His defensive foreign policy, such as the three wars with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870), consolidated his power and that of Prussia at the expense of antagonizing and alienating certain countries. His alliance with countries was tied less to the Second Reich's interests than to his political survival. Bismarck's intrigues with Austria-Hungary and Russia led a train of in what was described as "the finest example of diplomatic deception".

Bismarck may have been a master tactician and strategist in his foreign agenda before 1871, but the opposite holds true in his domestic policies. He "was unable to tolerate opposing points of view, however sincere, and always considered opposition to his policies as personal attacks, motivated by selfish or group interests". To him, the word "loyal opposition" was a contradiction in terms.

Therein lies the problem. Bismarck was energized by having foes to fight and vanquish, as he did with the Danes, Austrians, and French. In his struggles against the Catholics and the Social Democratic Party, he appeared not to shift gears--he just kept on fighting when he should have switched gears into peace mode, or better still, rest on his laurels and retire.

What brought his downfall was his lust for power that went to such an extreme, that in the face of being dismissed by Kaiser Wilhelm II, he was prepared to set events that would bring victory to the SDP, Catholic Center, and hardline Conservatives, whose policies were counter to the Kaiser's, in the 1890 elections. He would then convince the princes of the Reich's constituent states that the empire had undergone political paralysis. A military coup, on the pretext of a Social Democrat uprising, would follow. SDP leaders would be arrested, martial law would be declared, and the Reichstag dissolved. Germany would then become a military dictatorship.

Kent's book has successfully depicted the flaws of Bismarck's mindset, in which he placed his personal political survival before the interests of the political entities he governed, and that is the rust that tarnished the image of the "Iron Chancellor."

I have just finished reading this book and the preceding two volumes. This is very solid work, and if you appreciate, as I do, feeling that an author has done good and careful research you will like these volumes. I have concluded that to really understand the Hitler period one must learn more about the 19th century in Germany. It seems to me that Bismarck, by his brilliant defense of autocratic rule in Germany, helped make Hitler possible. The footnotes in these volumes are where they are supposed to be--at the foot of each page--but it is regrettable that there is no bibliography as such.

There would be no German today as we know it without the Moltke Family. Their personal history is the history of the rise and fall of Germany. Friedrich's style is so fluid and engaging that the dead come to life, the scenes from all across Europe emerge. If you want to understand German history, this is the place to start.

In the relatively brief history of Germany as a unitary state (131 years old this year), few non-royal families have played as important a role as the von Moltke family. In a time when the 'sweeping family saga' is a popular fiction genre, the fact that this story isn't only true, but also extremely well written, should commend it to any reader with an interest in European history.

Of course, the von Moltke family's impact actually reaches back before the Reich into the history of Prussia. The first of three men Otto Friedrich focuses on, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), was Prussia's key military strategist during the Franco-Prussian War, and possibly Germany's greatest strategist ever, surpassing even his friend and mentor, Clausewitz. His nephew and namesake, General Helmuth von Moltke (1848-1916), on the other hand, was nervous, indecisive, and largely unable to deal with the responsibilities of command that came to him in part due to his famous name. The third Helmuth, Count Helmuth James von Moltke (1907-1945), was one of nature's noblemen. A liberal (in the European sense), he was actively involved in the opposition to Hitler and Nazism -- a fact that led to his execution shortly before the Reich's own collapse. The letters Helmuth James wrote from prison, to his wife most notably, but to others as well, are deeply moving, and filled with a Christian spirit that reminded me of St Paul's own epistles from prison.

Otto Friedrich is a tremendously skilled historian, and also an excellent writer. 'Blood and Iron' is well documented, logically presented, and also very readable. Plus, he's not afraid to share his opinions and interpretations, most particularly in 'A Note on Sources' following the close of the narrative. His insights there on other documents and histories are well worth reading. As, indeed, is this entire book. I recommend it very highly.

A recurrent feature of Hollywood war movies of the sixties and seventies was the "good German" - the anti-hero (often played by a Max Schell type, though James Mason as Rommel was another attempt) who, despite his allegiance, was essentially humane. Subsequent literature (e.g. Hitler's Willing Executioners) has largely exploded the myth that the Reich was riddled with conscientious objectors. Nevertheless, some Germans truly were on the side of the angels, and among them Helmuth James von Molke, who met his end in the aftermath of the briefcase bombing, was especially heroic. The last third of this book is devoted to his underground campaign to overthrow Hitler and establish a peaceful model for the future. The first subject of the book is his great-uncle, Helmuth von Molke of the Prussian General Staff, who masterminded Prussia's triumph over Denmark and then victory in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars of the 1860s and 1870s. Despite his association with Prussian militarism, old von Moltke was driven by a firm sense of personal ethics, and for all the pain associated with his wars, at least they were brief. The same cannot be said for his nephew, the hapless Helmuth Johannes von Moltke, appointed Chief of the German General Staff in the lead up to World War One. Faced with the challenge of updating the already-flawed Schlieffen Plan, he actually managed to make it worse, dooming Germany, France, Belgium and Britain to four years of trench warfare. The von Moltkes are modern Prussia's most remarkable clan, and in the concluding chapter we are treated to a "Where Are They Now" of its surviving members.

A tremendous research job, revealing a lot about the way the world really worked. Bismarck was a bad, bad guy. My only complaint is that it got a little repetitive; editing out 10-15% of the text would make it much more readable.

Stern's magnificent work is one of the best pieces of historical research and writing of the last century. A strikingly original work, which transcends it specific topic, 'Gold & Iron' is a fascinating study of economics, politics and power and the relation between the three.

Required reading for any self-respecting student of history.

A classic work, as is usual from Stern. Unfortunately, the Amazon entry is garbled. Bismarck's banker's name was Bleichr[o with unlaut]der.

Newcomers to the exciting story of Germany's war-driven unification process will find this book extremely useful. It assumes no prior knowledge on the part of the reader, but gives enough detail to be considered a decent summary of recent historical research. Older hands will admire the sound judgements and the choice of primary sources. This is one of the best in the excellent Seminar Studies series.

The book is well written and organized. It helps to understand the complexity of German policy of the 2nd part of 19th century with maximal simplicity. But it should not be your first book if you know nothing about Bismark or divided Germany

Williamson does a brilliant job of simplifying the complex German policies before World War I. An interesting read for anyone who enjoys history.

Taylor's work on Bismarck is strangely contradictory. While he often makes reference to issues in German history that only knowledgable readers would understand, he also deals with the subject matter in a very superficial manner. While I found the work engaging and quick to read, it left me with a lot more questions than answers.

If you are looking for an in-depth review of Bismarck's life, don't go here. But if you want a quick read that deals effectively with the greater issues of Bismarck's career, then this is it.

Arrogant, confrontational, self-absorbed: one would be hard pressed to determine if these characteristics should be found in A. J. P. Taylor's Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman or if they should be in his autobiography. Moreover, it is curious that many other distinguishing characteristics of Taylor's Bismarck are in many ways reflections of Taylor himself. This parallel could even be extended one step further to claim that Taylor's assessment of Bismarck might be similar to the present assessment of Taylor; that is, both must be praised for their remarkable achievements but praised in such a way that they would be opposed to it.
Taylor, England's most flamboyant historian,# often broke the traditional bounds of the field. He brought history to television, radio and the newspapers. He closed the gap of the historical wait period by writing a history of the origins of War World II in 1961. His flashiness aside, he produced many historical masterpieces including Bismarck. In this work he goes beyond the face value of Bismarck's recorded statements and examines the actions, and subsequently his motives, to find the true character of this monumental figure. He develops the notion of a opportunistic and self-centered Bismarck as opposed to loyal servant of the king whose great foresight brought the unity of Germany.
One major theme of the book is chance. It is argued that it was stoke of luck that allowed Bismarck even enter the field of politics, the bad health of another deputy. Even his great foreign policy was based on providence. Repeatedly Taylor asserts that Bismarck had no plan, rather he would let events unfold and then act from there. Furthermore, when Bismarck intentionally carried a line of policy through it would normally backfire causing him more harm. Taylor remarks, the genius of Bismarck lie not in brilliant initiatives but in being able to recover from past blunders.
Closely related to the theme of chance is the notion that Bismarck had no enduring principles. His own greatness was the only value that he held to as he morphed from reactionary to liberal to conservative. He proudly boasted to the Reichstag "I have no fixed opinions... there are no eternal truths" (138). Beside his own will, the only other exception of complete devotion was his family. However, this might even be challenged. One the boldest claims of the book is that some of Bismarck's landmark achievements, unification and social reform, came as by-products for his bid to stay in power. Explicitly, his main motive for introducing bills was to split the Emperor and Reichstag and thus increase his power; and similarly his main motive for foreign policy was to split the Great Powers to increase Germany and subsequently his power.
In many respects it is a difficult task writing the biography of a man who is a deceptive diplomat. Bismarck's documents and speeches are overflowing with contradictions. It seems that Bismarck's policies stemmed from the hope of a desired outcome instead of personal convictions. Nonetheless, the historian has the difficult task of sifting through the political jargon to find the true motives of this complicated person. Taylor largely discredits Bismarck's talk of humble servitude towards the monarch and instead supports the Bismarck's claim of his own greatness. However, how can one claim certitude with a man who has changed his memoirs repeatedly, had no scruples in contradicting facts, and supported so many opposing principles? This is a contributing fact to the case that this debate will go on. As it does, Taylor's work will do much to help guide those who seek the motives and beliefs or the real Bismarck.

Arrogant, confrontational, self-absorbed: one would be hard pressed to determine if these characteristics should be found in A. J. P. Taylor's Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman or if they should be in his autobiography. Moreover, it is curious that many other distinguishing characteristics of Taylor's Bismarck are in many ways reflections of Taylor himself. This parallel could even be extended one step further to claim that Taylor's assessment of Bismarck might be similar to the present assessment of Taylor; that is, both must be praised for their remarkable achievements but praised in such a way that they would be opposed to it.
Taylor, England's most flamboyant historian,# often broke the traditional bounds of the field. He brought history to television, radio and the newspapers. He closed the gap of the historical wait period by writing a history of the origins of War World II in 1961. His flashiness aside, he produced many historical masterpieces including Bismarck. In this work he goes beyond the face value of Bismarck's recorded statements and examines the actions, and subsequently his motives, to find the true character of this monumental figure. He develops the notion of a opportunistic and self-centered Bismarck as opposed to loyal servant of the king whose great foresight brought the unity of Germany.
One major theme of the book is chance. It is argued that it was stoke of luck that allowed Bismarck even enter the field of politics, the bad health of another deputy. Even his great foreign policy was based on providence. Repeatedly Taylor asserts that Bismarck had no plan, rather he would let events unfold and then act from there. Furthermore, when Bismarck intentionally carried a line of policy through it would normally backfire causing him more harm. Taylor remarks, the genius of Bismarck lie not in brilliant initiatives but in being able to recover from past blunders.
Closely related to the theme of chance is the notion that Bismarck had no enduring principles. His own greatness was the only value that he held to as he morphed from reactionary to liberal to conservative. He proudly boasted to the Reichstag "I have no fixed opinions... there are no eternal truths" (138). Beside his own will, the only other exception of complete devotion was his family. However, this might even be challenged. One the boldest claims of the book is that some of Bismarck's landmark achievements, unification and social reform, came as by-products for his bid to stay in power. Explicitly, his main motive for introducing bills was to split the Emperor and Reichstag and thus increase his power; and similarly his main motive for foreign policy was to split the Great Powers to increase Germany and subsequently his power.
In many respects it is a difficult task writing the biography of a man who is a deceptive diplomat. Bismarck's documents and speeches are overflowing with contradictions. It seems that Bismarck's policies stemmed from the hope of a desired outcome instead of personal convictions. Nonetheless, the historian has the difficult task of sifting through the political jargon to find the true motives of this complicated person. Taylor largely discredits Bismarck's talk of humble servitude towards the monarch and instead supports the Bismarck's claim of his own greatness. However, how can one claim certitude with a man who has changed his memoirs repeatedly, had no scruples in contradicting facts, and supported so many opposing principles? This is a contributing fact to the case that this debate will go on. As it does, Taylor's work will do much to help guide those who seek the motives and beliefs or the real Bismarck.

A nice little read of the diplomacy of Bismarck and Napoleon III prior to the Franco Prussian War. What is so apparrent by this book is how the French and the French government were so arrogant about their power. Most people subscribe to the fact of Bismarck causing the war. However this book shows how the inflamed opinion of the French and their government led to the war. Popular opinion blames the Prussians but it was the French who caused the war.
Wetzel shows the French interfering in the affairs of the Spain to place their candidate on the throne. The Spanish provisional government was not especially interested in their candidates, and ultimately decided on a Prussian prince. This was even more unacceptable to the French government. They then demanded the Prussian prince to renounce the throne. This the Prussians did. Then they demanded the Prussians apologize for their actions and completely renounce any interest. When this did not happen, they went to war against a German nation angered by the French actions. Subsequent actions paint the French as the victims when the opposite was the case. The French played into the hands of Bismarck.
A great read for those interested in the diplomacy prior to the war. Michael Howard's Franco-Prussian War is also a great read of the war itself.

Does a fine job explaining how the war happened. Recommend it to anyone curious about the issue.

The title of this detailed account of the origin of the FrancoPrussian war in 1870 refers to Louis Napoleon 3, nephew of Napoleon, and Otto Bismarck. The FrancoPrussian War ended the government of Emperor Louis Napoleon 3 and gave Bismarck the opportunity to unify Germany.

Wetzel begins his book by describing the characters. There is the French Emperor Louis Napoleon and his diplomats Ollivier, Gramont. Their Prussian opponents are chancellor Bismarck, and Kaiser William and their subordinates. Then Wetzel explains the background, the decline of French power and the rising strength of Prussia. We see how Ollivier, Gramont and Empress Eugenie let their passions and nationalist chauvinism blind them to the new weakness of the French army and the growing strength of Prussia

Wetzel explains the complicated succession struggle in Spain. No candidate could hope to win without total permission of France. Wetzel analyzes Bismarck's complex policy toward the succession and France and comes to some non traditional conclusions.
Wetzel follows the actions of Bismarck and Napoleon 3, as well as the actions and mistakes of their individual subordinates. We see the expertise of French diplomats such as Visconti-Venesto and Benedetti. Most of all we see the belligerence of Gramont, who left no mistake untried.

This book is not always easy to read, since Wetzel goes into great detail about the actions of all the diplomats involved. Wetzel bases his book on both primary and secondary sources and includes an informative bibliography with notes. This book ends right before the outbreak of the FrancoPrussian war, so there are no discussions of military strategy or tactics.

Edward Crankshaw's 'Bismark' is quite simply the finest one-volume edition available. Written with Crankshaw's customary elegance, wit and style, this is a perfect introduction to the student of Bismark and German unifiacation.

In this book Hamerow attempts to explain the complexity of Bismarck from a variety of aspects and viewpoints. It is a collection of short articles and extracts from other books written by a group of historians who examine different aspects Bismarck's life and accomplishments from different viewpoints.

Some historians like Hajo Holborn discuss Bismarck's early life and influences. Others like William Langer and Eyck discussed his politics and diplomacy.

But this book is also a group of opinions of historians about Bismarck. There are those like Arnold Meyer who adore Bismarck. Some like Eyck, who referred to Bismark as the 'Subverter of Freedom' despised Bismarck and some like Seton-Watson and Langer simply supply shrewd observations. The result is an excellent thumbnail sketch of Otto von Bismarck.