The cultural context in which Kant's Critique of Pure Reason appeared was a complex and volatile mixture that responded to his work in a prolonged period of philosophical fireworks culminating in Hegel. This extremely interesting history of the first decade of reactions to Kant foretells in many ways the whole fate of modern philosophy, beginning with the first delayed review and then the attacks and challenges from Rheinhold to Jacobi and Maimon. One must wonder if this debate advanced beyond or frittered away the Kantian advance, as the outcome seems so very much to produce the reversal of original intent. Yet the issues raised by these critics are essential to consider, and often fail to appear in purely partisan accounts. The history stops before even Fichte and yet zooming in on this curious scene in detail brings alive the real issues that will echo all the way to Schopenhauer, and beyond.
It is, presumably, a quibble to point out that the word 'fate' is severely cautioned at the begining of Kant's deduction. One should wonder at its usage here. Perhaps this comedy of sudden philosophical raining cats and dogs ambushing Kant is a tragic fate in search of tragicomedy.

There are better works available on German Idealism than this 600 page volume, which is unfortunate because it would indeed have been handy to have an accurate portrayal of the philosophical period it purports to describe, and to have it in English. Despite Beiser's claim to refrain from treating the relationships between this epoch's key figures -- namely Fichte, Schelling, Holderlin, and Hegel (the ommission of the latter makes the book's title simply inaccurate) -- he does indeed construct a narrative from the records of their engagements with each other (letters, etc). All these men knew each other, and they all read each other's work, and Idealism would not have existed in the form it took were this not the case. While other reviewers lament a treatment of Hegel, I would stress the absence of Kant in this book: Beiser may well argue against a Hegel bias in academic research (although this is surely wrong), but were it not for Kant German Idealism would never have existed in the first place (and this is the second reason why the title is misleading). For those who want to understand Idealism, it means that works by other authors should be read (or at the very least consulted, if only to appraise Beiser's claims to be authoritative, something which is evidenced throughout by his strident tone), and, as with all real scholarship, articles as well. Superb alternative works that treat Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Holderlin, and Hegel have been written by Dieter Henrich, Eckhart Forster, and Paul Guyer, and all exist in English; Manfred Frank's distinguished work is in German; and the French have contributed with incisive works on Hegel (by Jean Hyppolite) and on the important relation of the Early German Romantic's critical theory to the philosophy of Idealism (by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe), and all are available in English translation; lastly, a masterful exposition of Schelling's thought by Jean-Francois Courtine is available in French. In sum, a book on "German Idealism" that lops off Kant on the one end and Hegel on the other just cannot be said to have covered the ground that the title implies.

Among the silliest of the many silly ways of criticizing something is to complain that it is not what it has no pretense of being. The title of Beiser's book, as well as its length and its rather hefty price, make it sufficiently clear that it is not intended as a general popular introduction to all German Idealism. Rather, it is scholarly inquiry into a phase of German Idealism that, while not altogether neglected, is too often regarded as merely a preparation for Hegel's triumphant system. That Beiser's study cuts off at 1801 relieves him of the need to deal with Hegel apart from his relation to Fichte and Schelling, and it no doubt reveals the bias of the reviewer from Cambridge that, seemingly having missed this point, he does not also accuse Beiser of neglecting to speak about Schelling's essay on the Human Freedom, his philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, Fichte's later systems, or perhaps even Solger's aesthetics, all of which also fall within the fold of German Idealism.
Granting the self-imposed temporal constraints of his inquiry, Beiser's aim is not to exclude or marginalize Hegel and deny his significance for German idealism, but rather to rescue the singular originality and grandeur of moments within the history of German Idealism that have fallen into the shadow of the leviathan to which they gave birth. While this very effort is somewhat compromised by Beiser's epistemological orientation, and I do not entirely agree with his ultimate reading of German Idealism as a neo-Platonism anticipating the Neo-Kantianism of Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer, I nevertheless admire the rigor and clarity of this work, and would strongly recommend to all those who have a more than dilettantish interest in German philosophy.

The review below which claims that Beiser says that Hegel is "tendentious" is not correct. Beiser's text reads, "Hegel's history of the period, which interprets it as a progression culminating in his own system, is tendentious philosophically, and anachronistic historically" (ix). This is certainly not the same as claiming that Hegel is tendentious. In addition, Beiser's criticism is quite correct; Hegel's history of philosophy is quite tendentious.