This is one book that offers much MORE than its title promises. Not only do the opening chapters offer one of the clearest expositions of Clausewitz's rather abstruse (though worthwhile) writings on the philosophy and practice of war, but the book presents a clear review and critique of how the principles and practice of war was taught in the English speaking world in the past century and a half. The reception of Clausewitz in the US and the former British Commonwealth nations has been mixed, as Bassford shows through his skilfull and fascinating tour of military academy textbooks and the writings of thinkers such as Liddell Hart, Fuller, Hamley, Henderson, and some lesser known lehrmasters of modern combat. This is not dry academic theorizing but a well-written crash course in the way our conception of the higher direction of war has evolved. Bassford shows how, the taint of Prussian, then German "militarism" has unfairly been used against Clausewitz by superficial (or cynical) interpreters ... people who use C. to embellish the "martinet" stereotype.

Whether or not you agree with Bassford's criticisms of well-respected modern military historians such as Liddell-Hart and Keegan, his arguments are cogent and clear.

Anyone addressing the "problem" of total war should consult this book and keep it handy.

Bassford's critique is as valid now, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the military drawdown, the Gulf War and the radical shift in missions, as it was in the last year of the Reagan presidency. This validates his assertion that the Army's problems are systemic, rather than personal or situational. His examples will ring true to anyone who has worn the uniform for more than a week. His prescriptions for change are bold and insightful. I'm not sure they would all work, but they all merit discussion and consideration. This book is as important and valid today as the day it was published. It should be required reading for any officer candidate.

I guess the content is still good considering that it is Clausewitz. I thought that it was confusing to figure out whether the content was Clausewitz' words or the author. I guess I was also looking for more explicit applications of Clausewitz theory. To be honest, I learned more about Clausewitz reading Colin Powell's biography than reading this book. There is still lots of good stuff in this book though if you can buy it for cheap.

Though the editors freely admit that business and war are different, and that mapping one to the other is a mistake, this book seems to be based on exactly that idea. After September 11, 2001, business-as-war metaphors seem overblown. Many in business have stopped looking at competition as a death struggle. Instead, they treat it as a mutual effort to foster growth in their sectors so everyone then benefits from the resulting synergies. That said, this compilation, which condenses sections of Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz's major work, On War, is well worth reading, though dense and sometimes difficult to follow. Clausewitz, a fascinating thinker, approaches his subject with wit and clarity. By his own description, his real contribution isn't his analysis, but the analytical method he applies to problems. We from getAbstract find his approach clearly relevant to anyone struggling against an intelligent and resourceful opponent, in business, politics or government, as well as to those pondering ways to go to war.

This is not a strategy "handbook", rather a thoughts collection of a superior mind: Clausewitz is a strategist of past times (a prussian general), but he has a modern strategy view (he looks like a true "top level" CEO). I hope The Strategy Institute of The Boston Consulting Group will issue soon other volumes, but I think it will be almost impossible to have another success like this (given the introduction depthness and the appropriate writings selection and comment).