David Halberstam masterfully weaves the story of the evolution of post-cold war American foreign policy. He begins with the Bush years, leading into and ending with the Clinton years. Bush, he points out, was in love with foreign policy and, for the most part, excelled in its execution at the sacrifice of his domestic duties. Clinton was elected largely for his commitment to domestic issues in a time when we all thought that foreign policy was less important after the cold war...a time of peace. However, even given Bush's love of foreign policy, the confusion of the post cold war era made it difficult to determine where the issues really were. Iraq was easy for Bush. In his mind, a clear cut case of good versus evil. Bosnia, on the other hand, didn't draw as much interest and he ignored a situation that ultimately led to genocide. Enter Clinton, who early on professed that foreign policy did not matter. Only when it threatened his presidency did he finally act. Beyond Clinton, the conflicting viewpoints of other key players such as Tony Lake, Dick Holbrooke, Colin Powell, and Madeleine Albright come clearly into view in Halberstam's excellent analysis.

Hindsight is 20/20 and it is easy to find fault in retrospect. What becomes clear in this book is how muddied the post cold-war era has become. The possible paths for our foreign policy are more complex than ever, with no clear arrow pointing the way. What is certain, however, is that there is no avoiding the need for a strong American foreign policy.

Now, more than ever, all Americans should read this book to better understand why we are once again at war in a time of peace.

David Halberstam's War in a Time of Peace is a massive look at American foregin policy in the 1990s, through the presidencies of Bush and Clinton. Bosnia and Kosovo are the centerpieces but the book also touches meaningfully on Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. The thumbnail biographical portraits of all the leading American figures is a great joy and asset of this book. Foreign policy can be a confusing issue, not least of all because of its lack of intelligible coverage in the media or on campaign trails. Halberstam makes all these complex issues and myriad personalities shine through clearly. His critiques of the media are particularly important and compelling and this book is a refreshing antidote to the sort of journalism television has thrust to the fore. This is a valuable book but, most of all, it is a enjoyable and fascinating read.

This is an excellent behind the scenes look at the processes, and lack there of, that took America through three post-Cold War "Teacup" wars: Mogadishu, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Halberstam shows that, while George Bush did well overseeing the end of the Cold War, his administration was not prepared for the tribal/ethnic upheavals that followed near the end of his term. More significantly, the author demonstrates that Clinton remained behind the power curve in this arena throughout most of his presidency.

With Clinton focused on his domestic agenda, his administration was divided among themselves regrading policy in East Africa and the Balkans, the president did not take charge, and the pentagon opposed the administration and, at times, its own field commander.

Halberstam's review reminds us how NOT to run wars, and that, regardless of how much an American chief executive wants to concentrate on domestic matters, foreign policy will pull him in. A U.S. president ignors the affairs of the world at his own political peril, and often at the world's real peril. After all, as the Slovenian foreign minister once said, "...the political will of the free world begins and ends in the oval office."