I've long been very familiar with the 1st Marine Division's history at the Chosin, but until I read Roy Appleman's book I didn't realize just how much I didn't know about the Army's side of the conflict. This tale of desperation and bravery should be required reading amongst all American service personnel and perhaps even in High Schools. Excellently written, this book holds your attention despite the huge amount of very detailed geographic and unit data presented.

I've read a lot of military history over the years, though I'm definitely not as well-read as some. This book and the others in Appleman's Korean War series really helped me understand small unit operations. They can be dry and a little tough going, but if you give them a chance you may discover a side of battle often overlooked. Making great use of original after action reports as well as interviews and the more common types of sources, Appleman reminds us that (unlike the movies) often ammunition and rations run out and what happens when they do. (Real men have to be sent to get more.) He shows us how and why troops are moved from one nondescript hill to another. (Almost never due to command brilliance.) And better than anyone else he shows us how great battles are built up from squad and platoon actions.

You may lose track of which regiment "L Company" is a part of, but you will come to care what happened to L Company.

A very engrossing account. Despite the level of detail on the geography, personnel and their units it holds your attention. Also provides comment on areas of uncertainty over what actually happened. One of the most successful books on warfare in putting you there - to the point where it was difficult to read ( in this case an indication of the author's success ). One really sensed the isolation of the units and the desperate situation in which they found themselves. Recommended.

I am reading this book and downloading it, on line. Cannot get the maps on line. Would love to own a hard copy of this book.

Anyone who had a relative in the Korean War can follow what their loved one went through by reading this book.

This is a great book, hard to put down once you start to read it, the maps of battle scenes are outstanding. As a trustee of the Korean Veterans Nat'l Museum and Library to be built in Tuscola, Illinois I am sorry to here it is out of print because I know a lot of the books could be sold if available. Get it at your lirary and read it, you will not be disappointed.

I have purchased 2 of these books, 1 with maps and one with no mape. I want to know if the used one for sale by jenwelch2 used has the maps in the back of the book. I want to purchase this for a friend and need the book with the maps.

On Page 419 Under Base Development line 13 it should read of the six only IHEYA and KUNE were taken. I landed on Iheya.

Roy Appleman started working on this book when he was a combat historian in the US Army during the Korean War and continued into the 80s. By examining military records and interviewing many of the participants at all levels, he brings a great deal of detail to bear on a narrow focus: the experiences of the United States Eighth Army (with attached Turkish, British, and South Korean units) in the Korean War from November 24th, 1950 to December 26th,1950.

That detail can be mindnumbing at times, especially for a life-long civilian like me. A large portion of this book is taken up with such details as when x platoon detached from Company Y to occupy Hill Z. Appleman tries to be as clear as possible and substitutes organizing his history around units for a straight chronological telling of events. On occasion, he stops to remind us what is happening elsewhere simultaneous to the events he is covering or backtracks to place things in context. There are plenty of maps, many of them detailed, but the book could have used even more.

The book doesn't start to get really interesting until about half way through when Appleman takes up the harrowing retreat of the 2nd Infantry Division from Kunu-ri. This account, even more than the rest of the book, is drawn from post-combat interviews since most of the official records were lost. It tells of an approximately six mile retreat, done by some units at night in subzero temperatures, down a narrow road while under enemy fire from both sides. It is an example of confused command, bad coordination between units, and courage and cowardice.

After the retreat from Kunu-ri, we get the details of Operation Bug-Out, its unofficial title in some quarters, when the UN forces fled approximately 300 miles south of their most northernly positions in Korea.

All this detail, while boring at times, is sometimes quite informative to those unacquainted with the details of military logistics. I gleaned, in passing, some understanding of how advances and retreats are planned, the intricacies of the quartermaster's work, and the coordination of artillery support with the infantry.

As you would expect from the author of the US Army's offical history of the first five months of the Korean War, this book is also partially intended as a case study for professional military men. Appleman criticizes the actions of everyone from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur to the behavior of privates. He restates the frequent criticism that MacArthur's notion of reunifying Korea was foolish. Korea's border with China was unpatrollable by the forces MacArthur had to say nothing of his misreading of Chinese intention and capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should have denied MacArthur permission to advance to the Chinese border. Appleman also notes a general lack of ground reconnaisance to scout out the disposition of Chinese forces before and after their second offensive. It was failure to maintain contact with the enemy which was partially responsible for the decision not to form a defensive line at the waist of Korea in December 1950 even though the Chinese did not, indeed could not, follow the retreating forces.

On the mid-levels of command, Appleman also notes problems. In the withdrawal from Kunu-ri, Colonel Freeman's controversial decision not to perform a rearguard action for the retreating column is covered. Appleman sees it as a breakdown in coordination and the chain of command. Appleman also notes how General Walker had units in reserve but did not use them in a northward attack to clear the Chinese roadblock between Sunchon and Kunu-ri. He mentions, but has no explanation for, the British Middlesex Battalion's failure to support the retreat as ordered.

On the lowest levels, Appleman notes a general lack of discipline, with some notable exceptions, about maintaining supplies and equipment and also armor units failing to support infantry in clearing Chinese from the sides of the Kunu-ri-Sunchon road.

Appleman also stresses that his account corrects two misconceptions in the history of the Korean War. Chinese General Lin Piao, a legendary figure from the Long March, did not lead troops in the second Chinese offensive of the war, and the Chinese did not exploit a gap between the Eighth Army and the X Corps. Rather, they punched a whole in the front and exploited it.

Military professionals and veterans of the events covered should find this book valueable. Casual readers of military history will find parts slow going, but the book should ultimately reward their attention.

The Eighth Army's retreat from Northwest Korea after the invasion of the Chinese Army in 1950 is a difficult event to understand because of the simultaneous occurrence of many interconnected battles. Appleman's treatment of these events brings clarity to the overall picture, and brings into sharp relief the command failures and inconsistencies which exacerbated the defeat of U.S. forces. Unanswered in Appleman's detailed treatment, however, is the question of why the Eighth Army failed to carry out its declared intention to establish a defensive line north of Pyongyang. Instead, the Army seemed to lose all coherence and fall back in a panicked rush until it was well below the 38th parallel, long after it had lost contact with the advancing Chinese. Appleman's harsh evaluation of Col. Paul Freeman's decision to withdraw his regiment by the coast road is also somewhat controversial, although I must say that after reading Appleman's account of the sequence of events it is hard to disagree with his conclusion.

This is the larger story that contains in part East of Chosin, also by the author. The book talks about the roles of Marine and Army ground units, as well as Naval air support in the entire reservoir area and the MSR to evacuation at Hungnam. Despite the disaster east of the reservoir, the final evacuation to Hungnam occurred in a most professional mannner and in no way resembled a Dunkirk, despite US news media hysteria cooed on by their communist sympathizers.
On the other hand Appleman makes clear that while the Chinese had a manpower advantage (and even that was not as overwhelming as many thought), they had no artillery, tanks, air support or motor transit. Their largest weapons were small mortars.

Appleman is a powerful writer who elegantly weaves battlefield action, command decisions, and military analysis into a cogent text. Among his insights:
*** The 'gap' between 8th army and X corps (occupied by the savage peaks of the Taebek range) was of no military significance and had no bearing on the outcome of operations in North Korea/Chosin.
*** General Almond did have reservations about pushing deeply into the reservoir area. However, after the Chinese 'disappeared' into the hills, McArthur insisted they move forward and Almond complied.
*** The book has good summary coverage of the 37th RCT east of Chosin ['task force Faith']. Ironically, it was the Chinese 80th division encounter with TFF, rather than proceeding directly to Hagaru-ri, that may have cost the Chinese a crucial victory at the southern tip of Chosin, on their first night attack at Hagaru-ri.
*** Often overlooked in the successful breakout was the role of the Far East Cargo command, providing ammunition and medical supplies by the ton to the escaping convoy.
*** Task Force Dryesdale, a tank-led column from Koto-ri NORTH to reinforce Hagaru, suffered heavy losses; but those who did make it provided vitally needed, experienced reinforcements.
*** The 2nd Chinese attack at Hagaru-ri, although better organized, had lost the 'element of surprise', so the Chinese suffered massive losses. In fact, this defeat turned the tides in favor of the Army and Marines at Chosin.
*** Armchair analysts and military brats should compare Faith's verbal orders to his task force at the Pyongnuri-gang Inlet with the far more coordinated USMC air-ground withdrawal from Yudam-ni and beyond.
*** Still, Appleman gives a far better account of the performance of Army units in the march south of Hagaru-ri than Donald Knox and others have. This is especially true on hill 1081 near Funchilin pass, with frequent praise of Captains Rasula and Kitz and Lt. Colonel Page.

Especially useful is the last chapter where Appleman evaluates Chinese and X corps command and field decisions. Appleman feels the Chinese were correct to attack UN forces directly at Chosin. An attack further north would have left Hungnam open for evacuation or reinforcement. An attack further south would not be a surprise since X-corps knew Chinese were in the area.
Appleman feels the Chinese attack at Chosin failed for several reasons. First, their manpower advantage was not as overwhelming as many writers suggest. 'Human Wave' tactics were largely a myth, though the Chinese often massed attacks on one spot. Perhaps most important, the US Marines did not panic: they remained and fought in their perimeters (no better example than Fox company at Toktong pass) as they moved south.
Appleman slips into military jargon--"element of surprise"; "mass of forces"; still, at Hagaru the Chinese lost the former and didn't capitalize on the latter. He also is stretching military journalism a bit in his references to "Xenophon's retreat from Asia Minor." But the fact remains that the Marines knew they had to control the higher ground in order to retreat. The Army did not: neither east of Chosin, nor in the west at Kunu-ri.