This book stinks! I mean come on! The first submarine to ever sink an enemy ship is the H.L. Hunley, not the R.L. Huntly!!! This is the first submarine to seek an enemy ship in the world; atleast spell it right and give it the right name!!! This ship is named after it's biggest investor, Horace L. Hunley! The last time I checked Hunley didn't have a "t" in it and Horace didn't start with "R"!!! I wish that when people write books about the Civil War they would do their research because it is books like these that misinform people. Luckily, I'm not stupid enough to spell this important piece of naval history INCORRECTLY!!! So hats off to Bern Anderson for screwing up the minds of people who buy this book. Oh Bert, if you ever decide to write another book make sure you know what you're writing about!!! If anyone doesn't believe about the spelling you can go to the Friends of the Hunley webpage and SEE IT FOR YOURSELF!!!

Considering the original date of publication (1962) and the experience and background of the author, this is a well written, well researched "paper" about US Navy activity in the war.

However, given the other volumes exhaustively researched, and wriiten about the naval history of the Civil War, including W.T. Scharf's contemporary history of the CS Navy, this book is nothing more than a political justification of naval policies and the ramblings of a romantic career naval officer.

I don't mean to belittle Admiral Anderson's motives or qualifications for writing this book, but this is not a history book. It is written like a tabloid article full of heresay, leading statements, and falsehoods.

The author repeatedly condradicts himself, often within the same paragraph. He states early on that the Union Blockade of southern ports was wholly effective, starving the the south. Yet he then admits to the ease at which blockade runners could traverse the "blockade" encouraging many Southern, British, and even Northern business speculators to outfit ships for this extremely lucrative trade!

Other sources list Confederate losses to the blockade as less than 5% of all the attempts to bring in imported goods (mostly wool, weapons, medications, fine liquers and spirits, fancy silks and other luxuries) and to export cotton and tobacco to Europe. Admiral Anderson does admit that the blockade was ineffectual at first, (try 3 or more years!) and that most of the runners captured were in late 1864 and early'65.

So how does he justify the statement of the blockade being wholly effective?

He does however deal with several points that are not well covered in other histories, such as Secretary Seward's belief that a war with Spain over Haiti and her neighbor would bring the South back into the Union; and the issues over the Foreign Enlistment Act of the United Kindom and the Commonwealth, including the cheating of Irish nationals duped into enlisting in the Federal Army with a large enlistment bonus and free passage to New York, only to have it taken in "commissions" by the "agent" who brokered the agreement. And the recruiting of British seamen for the US and CS navies, the very issue that led to the War of 1812 with Britain.

I have yet to read Commander Bulloch's contemporary account of his participation in the aquisition of ships and weapons in Europe for the Confederacy, but I do know that Admiral Anderson shortchanged both Bulloch and Secretary Mallory, calling them both ineffecient and downplaying their roles and contributions in creating a Confederate Navy from the ground, up.

He claims that superior Federal Naval abilities and Confederate Naval incompetence decided the fate of new born nation. Yet, he brags on the ingeniousness of Confederate mine warfare, the Davids, the Hunley, stationary torpedoes (mines), and the commerce raiders, that all played important parts in two world wars in the following century.

Not bad for a poor agrarian economy with no major industrial complex!

Yes my sympathies do lie south, but my training and loyalty was and is with the same Navy as Flag Officer Anderson's.

To summerize, the author over credits the federal beaurocratic navy, and trashes the south, only to condradict himself repeatedly. His sources were the "Official Naval Records" and Personal writings of Northern officers.

History is written by the victors.

There are many better, more accurate histories of both navies available. Read them instead if you seek scholarship. Read this book if have already read all the others. The few gems of insight and political saavy contained in this book should only be sought out after a more thorough understanding of the conflict is obtained.

And, be sure to read accounts from both sides of the fence. Or, you will cheat yourself, and dishonor the memory of thousands who fought and died for their beliefs.

Most popular histories of the Civil War focus almost primarily on land battles, almost to the exclusion of naval aspects of the war. What little reference there is to naval actions tends to be in the nature of trivia, such as the first submarine to sink a ship (C.S.S. R. L. Huntley), the first battle of ironclads in the Western World, the Monitor and Virginia (Merrimack) or songs about the daring Confederate raider, Alabama. As interesting as these anecdotes are, they fail to tell the true story of the important part that naval forces played in the Union conquest of the Confederacy. One seeking an understanding of the significance of the naval forces in the Civil War can find it in By Sea and By River: The Naval History of the Civil War by Bern Anderson. Anderson provides the reader with an excellent overview of naval aspects of the war.

The Union war plans called for conquest of the Confederacy by dividing the South and preventing the importation of needed manufactured goods from Europe. Despite attention directed toward the land war. the war was really decided in the West and along the Confederate coastlines. In these two theatres the Union Navy played a crucial role which is often overlooked by leading to the division and economic strangulation of the South.

The division of the Confederacy was achieved by two major thrusts, one down the Mississippi River and another through Kentucky, Tennessee and on to Atlanta, culminating in Sherman's March to the Sea. The thrust down the Mississippi involved significant naval action. The economic strangulation of the Confederacy, was achieved by the naval blockade.

The U.S. Navy on the western rivers was placed under the command of Captain Andrew H. Foote in September, 1861. In the beginning he was lacking only two requirements of a successful navy, boats and sailors. The shortage of boats was solved by purchases from the Eads Boatworks of St. Louis, founded by engineer James B. Eads, who is primarily remembered for building the Eads Bridge at St. Louis. The shortage of sailors was greater challenge. Although provided with sufficient officers, Foote was left to his own devices to recruit enlisted men. He finally achieved some success in recruiting sailors in the Great Lakes region. With the fleet assembled, Foote was ready to join General Grant in the planning and execution of the thrust down the Mississippi and other western rivers.

In November, 1861 Grant began moving against Confederate strongholds in Kentucky, transported by river and supported by naval gunboats. Grant's first great conquest in Southern territory was the conquest of Fort Henry, Tennessee on February 6, 1862. The attack was commenced by four gunboats under the command of Capt. Foote. The plan was for troops under Grant's command to cut off the fort from the rear while it was being bombarded from the river. Muddy roads and high water prevented Grant from cutting off the troops sent from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson. At 1:50, after less than two hours of naval bombardment, the fort surrendered. Grants troops then arrived to take possession.

The next Fort attacked was Fort Donelson on February 14. The fort yielded to a combination of bombardment by four gunboats and assault of 17,000 troops under Grant's command on February 15.

Action next shifted to the Middle Mississippi from March to June, 1862. The first Confederate obstacle encountered was Island No. 10, the tenth island south of Cairo. It surrendered on April 6, 1862 after a spectacular nighttime naval bombardment and a land assault. Similar methods were successful at Fort Pillow and Memphis. Vicksburg would fall to a land based siege and a naval bombardment from both river and ocean based vessels.

The main mission of the ocean going Navy was to enforce the blockade. This was accomplished by interception of blockade runners and the capture of ports. In his book, Anderson does a fine job of relating both the strategy behind the actions and details about the actions themselves. The actual nature of blockade running actions, involving the shallow draft runners against the deeper water naval vessels is described. The actions against port cities often involved a joint naval bombardment with land assault, the combination which was successful along the western rivers and in later wars. Prominent among these assaults were the captures of Charleston, New Orleans and forts guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay. The final assault upon Fort Fisher was a fitting conclusion to the campaigns of naval-land assaults. General Lee had predicted that his army could not hold out if supplies coming through Fort Fisher were cut. Within three months after the fall of Fort Fisher, the Army of Northern Virginia was compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

By Sea and By River also includes analysis of the effects of the campaigns on other aspects of the war. The stories of the Confederate raiders are told, both in their own rights, as well as the effect that they had on Northern commerce and the obligation they created on the Union Navy to reassign ships from blockade duty to raider chasing. The effect of the raiders and the blockade on relations with foreign nations, with particular regard to the Confederate attempts to obtain recognition and aid are discussed.

By Sea and By River provides the reader with a fine understanding of this most significant, but often overlooked part of a most studied war.