Aburish provides a good survey of the political history of Arab regimes for much of the 20th century. He provides good detail in particular on various frivolous interventions by the British and Americans. One can see some of the real historical basis of Arab paranoia against the west in these pages. At the same time, the worldview Aburish is illustrating has some major hollowness in it. He goes on ad infinitum about how the US and Britain are always thwarting the genuine ambitions of the Arab masses, and any genuine political reform. Yet what are the major goals he is championing? Democracy? Minority rights? Economic social justice? Transparency and accountability in government?

Nope, Aburish doesn't say word one about these things, apparently to him and the Arab masses, the only genuine ambition, the only goal of any political reform, is to allow Arab states to fully express the hatred their people have of the West and Israel. This seems to be the sole criterion he is using to measure an Arab regime's authenticity.

If that's what the Arab people's want, that's fine. But what's in it for the western reader, who actually stops a minute to think about what kind of world they want to live in? NOTHING. It was foolish for Aburish to even write this book in english if he intends it to influence western policies. Westerners who read this and who care at all about the well-being of their own societies, will probably come around to support Daniel Pipes positions on the Middle East, will have less faith in an understanding between civilizations, and will conclude, quite contrarily to Mr. Aburish's intent, that it is only by backing these regimes through cynical short-term meneuvers, that the west can protect itself against the fury that would surely come out of a democratized Arab world.

"There are no legitimate regimes in the Arab Middle East"

The very first statement in the book already makes clear the direction which Aburish's polemic will take. His central thesis is that 'the West' (shorthand for the USA, UK and France) has by a number of means skewed the political processes of the Arab region in its own favour to further geopolitical aims.

The West's goal is to maintain political divisions in the region, many of which are artificial and without popular support, so as to allow it untroubled access to its vital resource, oil. The buzzword in this power game is 'stability', taken here to mean a stable succession of pro-Western regimes. In this context the fostering of democratic values would invariably be counterproductive and the West has shown itself willing to cooperate with dictators and despots of any ilk, provided they do not attempt to upset the prevailing order.

Aburish claims that this leads to a tacit, and sometimes rather more obvious, cooperation between Arab governments and the West. In order to ensure the continuance of this cooperation, the West has taken to supporting regimes with minority popular acceptance, rendering them more likely to address Western interests ahead of those of their own people. In systematic case studies of each major regime, Aburish shows how the tiny elites of the Lebanese Maronites, Iraqi Sunnis, Saudi Wahabis and Syrian Alawis further Western interests. These elites - hailing from minority groups representing respectively 20%, 25%, 20%, 15% of their countries' populations - further Western interests in return for arms and guarantees against subversive activities by foreign (i.e. Western) intelligence agencies.

Major challenges to Western hegemony have come in the form of Nasser's pan-Arabism and the more modern Islamic Fundamentalism. These two movements achieved such potency and proved so dangerous to Western interests because they were blessed with the support of the Arab people. Although Aburish's claim is difficult to substantiate in the absence of any mechanism for determining the will of the Arab people, it nevertheless shows that the common people are systematically excluded from political decisions.

Aburish indicates a quasi-conspiracy of interest groups which collectively promote a false image of the Arab Middle East. These range from the governments involved (which draw financial and political benefit), to their field operatives (often driven by their own vanity and desire to enjoy the trappings of power), to the vast majority of journalists who are keen to follow the establishment line or in many cases simply too ignorant or lazy to cut through the tangled web of deception and disinformation. Many wealthy Arab businessmen and intellectuals (with a few notable exceptions), says Aburish, help to perpetuate this false view of the Middle East in which the simple Arabs must be protected from the onslaught of Islamic Fundamentalism and the West's primary goal is to furnish selfless assistance in regional development. Aburish points to the Arab diaspora centred on London which seeks to present itself in a favourable pro-Western light, and even sometimes Westernises aspects of itself.

Finally, no investigation into the Middle East would be complete without considering the Israeli and Zionist agendas. Aburish shows how Arab divisions have led to the consolidation of the Israeli state, with one Arab regime being played off against another. Whilst some are content to live with Israel so long as it does not threaten their own power bases (e.g. Suadi Arabia), other countries have behaved much more complicitly to the point of direct cooperation with Israel (eg. Jordan). Israel, in dealing with each Arab state separately, paradoxically creates further regional disunity.

In the end the losers are the Arab people who remain exploited and voiceless in the great melee of Middle Eastern politics. The winners are the corrupt governments of the Middle East, and the Western multinationals and shareholders to whose interests they pander.

Post 9/11 and during the infancy of the 'interim government' in Afghanistan we can see two major points of this book illustrated succinctly.
Firstly, the colonisation of the old Ottaman Empire awarding local rule to gangs and ascribing them legitimacy based on some flimsy genealogical or religious claim is being duplicated almost exactly in Afghanistan over 80 years later by picking leaders from the representatives of the politically-correct-sounding 'ethnic groups'.
Rather more urgently for us (the West), the massive destruction visited upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon may well be the beginning of 'the fire', the whole-scale clash of civilisations bred from the total dissatisfaction of an Arab majority who feel entirely unrepresented by what they see as Western backed dictatorships. 15 Saudis out of 19 hijackers looks like more than a coincidence and despite almost uniform condemnation throughout the 'Arab World' (well the leaders of it anyway) of the attack, Osama Bin Laden and his top men are hiding somewhere. Add to this the Arab governments' (understandable) unease about any US plans to attack Iraq (without the right provocation this time), popular Arab despair about any possibility of peace between the Palestinians and Israel, the effective fusing of Palestinian secular groups with their Islamist 'enemies' and you have a Middle East ready to completely explode. Let's see what happens dudes!

Aburish's biography of Saddam Hussein is a refreshing retelling of a story that's been muddled by a decade or more of half-truths and lies. The strengths are that he himself took part to a large extent in dealings with the Iraqi regime during the decade of the Iraq/Iran war. Aburish's insights and commentary are invaluable. The weaknesses in the book become readily apparent. Said has some duplicity in the regimes attempted acquisition of a nuclear [device] and other weapons of mass destruction. Said is also anti American and anti British. When he addresses US involvement in the Gulf War his arguments become tirades against Saddam , the US and Britain. It's his very ant-US and British attitude that make Aburish's recommendation for dealing with the Iraqi regime nothing but a mechanism for the continuation of oppression by Saddam and the so called Ba'athists.

Aburish's own involvement in the regime and view of the US aside, I highly recommend this biography of Saddam Hussein. He sets right many misconceptions about the Iraqi dictator. His mother was not a prostitute and Saddam didn't commit [destruction] at the age of 15. These myths and other myths are dispelled. What Aburish does is to emphasize the tribalness of Saddam by setting it in the context of Arab culture. Saddam becomes less a madman than a ruthless tribal leader for whom you are either with the tribe or against it. Opposition to the regime is treated like a blood feud. Even Saddam's affinity for Stalin makes sense. Both were the sons of poor peasants widowers in semi-tribal societies (Stalin was ethnically Georgian not Russian) and both used control of the bureaucracy to help in gaining control of power.

In spite of its weaknesses The Politics of Revenge is a highly readable and informative.

Breezy but informative bio that attempts to explain Hussein's stature as the most popular dictator in recent memory. Nice photos, too!

Aburish has written a good book on Saddam Hussein. One has to remember that it is part of the writing process to understand your readers' perspective. So, in this case it means that Saddam has to be judged by western standards. I have lived ten years in Iraq and liked especially Aburish Said's critical thinking towards horror stories that come from Iraq. I noticed while living in Saddam's Iraq (1980-1990) that iraqis tell all kinds of stories that are not to be taken literally. For example iraqis said that one European ambassador had slapped on the face of his European subordinate. The ambassador in question became very angry at such story. Of course it was true that this ambassador was angry, but to resort to physical violence is very serious matter in Europe. Iraqis just added this minor thing about hitting to illustrate how angry he was. I feel that in many cases stories that are coming out of Iraq are not exactly true in western sense. Aburish analyses well for example the case when Saddam killed his health minister. Iraqis hoped for peace, so they mixed their hope of peace with Iran to the fact that Saddam killed a minister. So story changed in the minds of iraqis, who thought that this minister had told something bad to Saddam in order to make peace with Iran. Aburish corrects many similar stories with his rational thinking. Of course it is true that Aburish has written his book mostly from his memory. So there are few mistakes. For example Saleh Ammash didn't die in 1975 (perhaps 1985 is correct). But these are minor things, because Aburish is so well informed about the Middle Eastern politics. It is always pleasure to read Aburishes books. His book about House of Saud is written with great wit.

Aburish offers a look, critical at times, into the life of leader Yasser Arafat. Aburish exposes many of the myths that prevail about Arafats past, most notably the myth that he was born in Jerusalem.

I agree with Kurt Jefferson when he says that this book, while often viewed as no more than a harsh critique of Arafat, is really offers backhanded praise of the Palestinian leader. Sure it offers criticism of the motivations of the PLO leader, but in discussing his earlier years, and the thoughts that drove him, Aburish develops in the reader a sympathy for Arafat that helps us see past some of his shortcomings.

Even reading through this harsh critic, my opinion of Arafat has remained largely favorable. If anything, I like him more now than before I read Arafat. Some key things with which Aburish does an excellent job"

-I've read quite a few books on the Arab-Israeli conflict, yet I didn't acquire a good understanding of the conflicts within the Arab community until reading this book. There are ample sources when writing about the Israeli's, but it is tough to come across good information about Arab politics. I commend Aburish in this respect.

-Aburish does an excellent job in detailing the ways in which Arafat was very successful in creating a seperate Palestinian identity apart from other Arab people.

-He does a good job in describing how Arafat, for better or worse, was able to consolidate his power and prevent the Palestinian cause from becoming fractured and marginalized, especially in the wake of the Israeli-Lebannon fiasco of the early 1980's.

Does Aburish's book paint a rosy picture of the PLO leader? Of course not--just look at the subtitle. But it does do a good job of describing where he comes from and what makes his mind ticks. If you can see past some of the unnecessary criticism, then you will be able to really appreciatte this book.

Palestinian journalist Said K. Aburish has written a systematic and scholarly overview on the political life of Yasser Arafat. With close attention to details and the factual precision of an historian or political scientist, Aburish paints a unique, although not surprising picture of the leader of the Palestinian Authority. Although most reviewers have noted Aburish's pungent critique of Arafat as an opportunistic, ever corrupt, and self-absorbed dictator, I find Aburish's Palestinian worldview tempers his criticism of Arafat and in some ways, backhandedly salutes and legitimates Arafat's actions over 40 years of fighting for the Palestinian cause. This humanizes Arafat and allows readers to look at him as one would Bill Clinton, Ronald Reagan, etc. This book is dense and contains information about Arafat's rise and his relations with his Arab brethren, the Israelis, and the USA. Interestingly, Arafat's rise to prominence, first with his Fatah (Conquest) organization and then as PLO head, occurs roughly over the period of profound tension and warfare between Israel and the Arabs over the Palestinian question (1960s-1980s). Aburish does a brilliant job portraying the character of the man and his ways (Arafat likes cornflakes with tea, "Tom and Jerry" cartoons, and can have a hot temper). Despite Arafat's penchant for opportunism and, at times, Machiavellian tendencies, Arafat appears to be more sensitive to peace than some have given him credit. Readers will learn much about recent (Cold War-era) Middle East history and politics. They will also learn much about the seemingly perpetual feud within the Arab world, and within the Palestinian political community as well. Aburish's book is dense, yet readable, and an excellent education on Arafat, the enigmatic, yet omnipresent leader of the Palestinians. Hence, this book will help one understand the current crisis(post-September 28, 2000 when the Al-Aqsa intifada started) and how it is once again encompassing Middle Eastern politics.

This book goes a long way to explaining why the Palestinian people have yet to find justice. Most 'biographies' of Arafat are caricatures which do not fully explain Arafat - either absurdely critical or absurdly adulatory. Aburish cuts down the middle, demonstrating time after time how Arafat's leadership persists, despite continually snatching defeat from the jaws of victory and despite surrounding himself with a coterie of corrupt hangers-on . Far from being a harsh critic, Aburish simply marshalls all the facts and then lets them (largely) speak for themselves. It is precisely Aburish's deep sympathy for the Palestinian people, yearning for freedom, which makes this biography so devastating. A brilliant portrayal of political corruption and opportunism.

This is a useful book in that it challenges the public image that the Saudi royal family has put much effort and money into establishing, especially here in the West. That image is one of a benign monarchy, one that provides generously for its people while promoting geopolitical stability in the region. Needless to say, Mr. Aburish presents a radically different view, one of a brutal family run dictatorship that is corrupt to the core and which ruthlessly squashes dissent at home while sowing seeds of disunity among the other nations of the region. There is no doubt but that, in daring to write this exposé, Mr. Aburish provides a useful service, since neither the governments nor the media in the West show much interest in examining the Saudi government with a truly critical eye, although to some extent this can be explained by the inherent cynicism of mainstream journalism. After all, it is pretty much taken as a given that most regimes in the area are corrupt, repressive and autocratic, so reporting such is basically a "Dog bites man" type of story.

Mr. Aburish's problem is that he simply goes overboard. His attacks too often seem personal in nature, although this can be explained by the fact that he dedicated this book to a friend who had been tortured to death by the Saudi secret police. He brings a sense of passion to this work, which is laudable, but too often it causes him to abandon any sense of objectivity in his quest to lambaste the House of Saud. As a result, this book reads less like the work of a professional journalist and more like a one-man act of personal vengeance. At times it becomes downright silly, such as when he attacks Saudi patriarch Ibn Saud for buying 40 Packards, which he derides as being "the most vulgar car of the 1940's". And it is rife with factual errors and general sloppiness, most notably in the latter chapters. Defense contractor Grumman is spelled "Grueman" and he makes reference to Vice President Edmund Muskie, a man who was only a vice presidential candidate on McGovern's losing 1972 ticket. But the worst part is simply the complete lack of any sort of even handedness, this book reads less as an accurate accounting of the Royal Family and more as a cheap piece of propaganda (most notably, the section on Desert Storm, parts of which could have been lifted straight from the Iraqi Ministry of Information). He makes numerous broad assertions without providing much, if anything, in the way of proof. Most notable is his claim that the present regime is loathed by the majority of Saudis and is teetering on the verge of collapse. Perhaps it is, but he gives precious little evidence to support it.

In addition, he seems incredibly naïve when it comes to economics and foreign affairs. On the latter, he accuses the Saudi government of constantly trying to manipulate its neighbors so as to avoid potential conflicts. Well, since when is engaging in pragmatic opportunism forbidden in the art of statecraft? It would seem the Saudi government has been eminently successful in avoiding both bloody foreign confrontations and internal havoc, a feat that the late Shah of Iran was incapable of. Also, while asserting that rank and file Saudis have been denied their rightful share of the oil wealth, he simultaneously attacks the Saudi government for not sharing more of that wealth with their fellow Arab nations, a move that would have been about as politically popular as if the American president promised to fork over a large percentage of American tax dollars to enrich the Mexicans.

Finally, he is on multiple occasions guilty of rank hypocrisy. For example, he is outraged at the treatment that ARAMCO oilmen initially gave to their Saudi workers, looking down at them and calling them "A-rabs", yet Aburish is hardly above indulging in blatant snobbery, most notably in which he sneers at the Saud family as if they were the Arabic equivalent of disreputable white trash. And yet, toward the end, he also takes Oil Minister Sheik Yamani to task for showing off his academic prowess and sophistication because it was "un-Arabic". And, in the final chapter, one gets the impression that Aburish simply doesn't know what he wants, other than the overthrow of the House of Saud. Does he want to see a Western style liberal democracy? Or an Iran style Islamic republic? Or a "constitutional monarchy"? He doesn't say. And that's the fundamental problem. Aburish is, to a greater or lesser extent, a useful critic of the Saudi regime. But what he utterly fails to do is offer up any sort of practical alternative.

It is difficult to imagine holding the Saudi royal family in lower esteem than does Mr. Aburish. Even so, he may very well be providing a popular Arab/Muslim view, and that alone is good reason Western students of the Middle East should read this book. Aburish shows why the House of Saud often pursues conflicting foreign policies, or policies that alleviate problems in the short term while exacerbating them in the long run. He presents countless royal family excesses and political missteps, and explains why the family is unpopular with its neighbors and perhaps with many of its fellow Saudis.

Though very informative, this book should be taken with a grain of salt. The author is by no means unbiased, and some of his facts and examples are not supported or don't square with other accounts. For instance, the report of the meeting between King Fahd and then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is very different from that of General Norman Schwarzkopf. While Schwarzkopf was present, Aburish was not and we are not told who his source was. In my own limited dealings with several of the royal family members (I was a military advisor before and during the Gulf War) I found those that I worked with to be dedicated, competent officers. Admittedly, their numbers were few and I have no knowledge of their personal lives.

In any event, if the author is correct in his assertions, and I suspect he is, America's continued unconditional support of the Saudi monarchy could eventually backfire. Aburish surmises that unless the United States actively encourages the House of Saud to reduce excesses and put forth more effort on behalf of the Saudi people, the result could be a situation similar to when the Shah of Iran was overthrown by Islamic fundalmentalists.

This book is well-written, well-documented and important. The author (who is writing from a country outside Saudi Arabia, but is himself a Saudi) minces no words in discussing the history, government and Royal Family. My personal view is that it is important to read books about other countries that are not authored by Americans. While this country has much more freedom in what is allowed to be written, read, published and broadcasted (the chapter on the Saudi press was very chilling), the media here tends to oversimplify many issues, and people don't take the time to hunt out other sources. Thus, another country is our "friend" one day in the news, the next they are "the enemy" and politics, foreign loans, arms deals, and all sorts of other goings-on are not really explained. This author explains the reasons behind everything that has been happening in the Middle East from 1900 on, and I certainly learned a lot about the Gulf War. In addition, I have read several books from the women's viewpoint in Saudi Arabia (e.g., Princess, Eight Months on Ghazzah Street), but this shows what is going on with the men in the ruling class. The author also did a good job of convincing me that the Saudi people may not be of one mind with the Royal Family, and that ordinary citizens can be subject to many abuses. Anyone who is interested in the Middle East ought to read this book. Informative, compelling and convincing.